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ABSTRACT
Most critical analyses assess citizenship deprivation policies against
international human rights and domestic rule of law standards, such as
prevention of statelessness, non-arbitrariness with regard to justifications and
judicial remedies, or non-discrimination between different categories of
citizens. This paper considers citizenship deprivation policies instead from a
political theory perspective—how deprivation policies reflect specific concep-
tions of political community. We distinguish four normative conceptions of
the grounds of membership in a political community that apply to decisions
on acquisition and loss of citizenship status: a ‘State discretion’ view, an
‘individual choice’ view, an ‘ascriptive community’ view, and a ‘genuine
link’ view. We argue that most citizenship laws combine these four normative
views, but that from a democratic perspective the ‘genuine link’ view is most
preferable. The paper subsequently examines five general grounds for
citizenship withdrawal—threats to public security, non-compliance with
citizenship duties, flawed acquisition, derivative loss, and loss of genuine
links—and considers how the four normative views apply to withdrawal
provision motivated by these concerns. The final Part examines whether
European Union (EU) citizenship provides additional reasons for protection
against Member States’ powers of citizenship deprivation. We suggest that, in
addition to fundamental rights protection through EU law and protection of
free movement rights, three further arguments could be invoked: toleration of
dual citizenship in a political union, prevention of unequal conditions for loss
among EU citizens, and the salience of genuine links to the EU itself rather
than merely to one of its Member States.
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INTRODUCTION
The main goal of this paper is to provide an overview of political theory
arguments regarding citizenship deprivation and to suggest normative stan-
dards for evaluating laws and State practices in this area derived from
conceptions of citizenship in democratic States.
This approach complements the discussion of external constraints on
States’ self-determination rights in matters of nationality through interna-
tional or European legal norms.1 A comprehensive political theory perspec-
tive needs to combine a domestic focus on internal standards of democratic
citizenship with standards of justice in international relations. Both of these
sets of norms generally go beyond positive legal norms.
We argue that political theory approaches face surprising problems in
defending a general prohibition to deprive citizens of their status. In the end,
we propose that a combination of a universal right to nationality, presumptive
stability of citizenship based on a genuine link between individuals and
States, and reciprocal duties in relations between States are sufficient to
ground a strong presumption against deprivation powers. This presumption
can, however, be defeated in a narrow class of cases in which involuntary loss
of citizenship seems justifiable. Defending this stance requires resisting a
broader trend towards instrumental uses of citizenship by States and individu-
als, which paves the way not only for over-inclusion, but also for enhanced
State powers of deprivation.
In Part I, we examine contemporary contexts of citizenship deprivation.
Part II proposes a terminological and conceptual framework for analyzing the
variety of deprivation provisions. Part III analyzes political theory perspec-
tives and outlines the general normative principles that we propose for
evaluating deprivation policies. Part IV discusses five material grounds for
citizenship deprivation that we identify as the dominant reasons underlying
current legislation. Part V considers whether EU citizenship adds anything to
the general presumption against deprivation powers of States.
I. A RETURN OF CITIZENSHIP DEPRIVATION
Despite the momentous development of the international system for
protection of human rights since World War II, the citizenship of a person
determines how she is treated by this system; the rights people effectively
have are still generally determined with a reference to the country they
belong to.2 The conventions against statelessness aim to assure that nobody
1. Rene´ de Groot, Survey on Rules of Loss of Nationality in International Treaties and Case Law,
57 CEPS PAPER LIBERTY & SECURITY EUR. (2013), available at https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/No
%2057%20Loss%20of%20Nationality%20ILEC.pdf.
2. Hannah Arendt famously argued that citizenship is “the right to have rights”, whereas “the
Rights of Man” proved to be inadequate to actually protect “abstract” human beings who were no
longer recognized by “their state.” HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 370 (2004).
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will remain outside the international system.3 Thus, they maintain it as a
system of States rather than transforming it into a cosmopolitan direction. We
are, and seem bound to always remain, ‘citizens of X.’ Nevertheless, the
impact of the enhanced protection of democracy and human rights within
Western States in the second part of the 20th century on citizenship was
profound and seemed to transform it from a privilege bestowed by a
sovereign government on those who were worthy of it, into an entitlement of
the sovereign citizen, whose status as such cannot be altered by the
government.4
In the new millennium, the expectation that ‘the right to have rights’ would
eventually be secured by divesting liberal democratic governments of the
power of citizenship deprivation has once again been challenged, in several
contexts. First, in the context of the relationship between public security and
citizenship, the most obvious challenge is global terrorism and the wide use
of extralegal means in fighting it.5 We shall return to the relationship between
public security and citizenship when discussing grounds for deprivation in
Part IV.
The second challenge concerns the linkage between citizenship and
migration. Whether citizenship properly belongs to those who have a
permanent interest in membership of the political community,6 or reflects the
depth of social relationships brought about by residence,7 political theorists
generally regard it as a secure status that must not depend on the government
of the day and its political goals. However, States increasingly use citizenship
instrumentally to control immigration by, for example, preventing family
reunification, rewarding special integration efforts, and attracting human
capital or financial investment by granting citizenship to particular high-
value candidates who have little or no personal ties to the relevant polity.
Examples of the last are provided by achievement-based admissions, e.g. in
Austria, and faster access to citizenship for foreign investors, e.g. in Cyprus
and Malta.8
She notes further that “the very phrase ‘human rights’ became for all concerned—victims, persecu-
tors, and onlookers alike—the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy.”
Id. at 344. According to Arendt, the right of asylum is the only one that stands for “the Rights of Man”
in international relations. Id. at 356. Arendt did not consider or discuss the inclusion of a human right
to nationality and the prohibition of arbitrary citizenship deprivation in Article 15 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
3. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Feb. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117;
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175.
4. See PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2013) (discusses the development of this in the United States).
5. See Peter J. Spiro, Expatriating Terrorists, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2169 (2014).
6. Rainer Baubo¨ck, Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A Norma-
tive Evaluation of External Voting, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2393 (2007); AYELET SHACHAR, THE
BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 2420-22 (2009).
7. JOSEPH H. CARENS, THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION 158-69 (2013).
8. See Jelena Dzankic, The Pros and Cons of Ius Pecuniae: Investor Citizenship in Comparative
Perspective (EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2012/14); Ayelet Shachar & Rainer Baubo¨ck, Should
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An even more blatant instrumental use of citizenship exploits its link with
the franchise. Voting rights in national elections are nearly universally
reserved for citizens and a large majority of democracies have recently
granted them to citizens residing abroad. It is therefore tempting for incum-
bent governments to extend citizenship to, or withhold it from, emigrant
populations or kin minorities in neighboring States in order to manipulate
electoral results. Notoriously, the Hungarian government of Viktor Orba´n
handed out passports to more than 500,000 ethnic Hungarians who had been
citizens and residents of neighboring countries since the end of the First
World War and who returned Orba´n’s favor by voting overwhelmingly for
him in the 2014 elections.9
From a citizenship perspective, the biggest problem of such instrumental
purposes shaping new legislation and policies is that citizenship no longer
adequately identifies those who have a claim to membership of the polity10
(though it may adequately indicate the success or failure of the respective
policy).11 Another major problem with the instrumental awards of citizenship
for the benefit of a current government is that such citizenship may be later
regarded as illegitimate and politically undesirable by a successor govern-
ment.12 In fact, the Maltese opposition announced in 2014 that they would
challenge the legitimacy of investor citizenship when elected to power.13 The
effect would not only be that instrumental expansions of citizenship lead to
subsequent retractions, but that citizenship may come to be seen less as a
secure and equal status independent of the way it has been acquired. In other
words, citizenship awarded for temporary and instrumental reasons may also
become exposed to deprivation for similar reasons.
The final context that helps to explain the rise of involuntary deprivation of
citizenship is the proliferation of multiple citizenship.14 The obvious link
Citizenship Be for Sale?, (EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/01); Sergio Carrera, How Much Does EU
Citizenship Cost? The Maltese Citizenship-for-Sale Affair: A Breakthrough for Sincere Cooperation
in Citizenship of the Union?, 64 CEPS PAPERS LIBERTY & SECURITY EUR. (2014).
9. See Kim Lane Sheppele, Hungary: An Election in Question, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014, 8:24
AM) http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/hungary-an-election-in-question-part-1/.
10. See Rainer Baubo¨ck, The Trade-Off between Transnational Citizenship and Political Au-
tonomy, in DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 69-91 (Thomas Faist and Peter Kivisto eds.,
2007); DUAL CITIZENSHIP FOR TRANSBORDER MINORITIES? HOW TO RESPOND TO THE HUNGARIAN-SLOVAK
TIT-FOR-TAT, RSCAS Working Paper (Rainer Baubo¨ck ed., 2010), No. 75.
11. Note that even if citizenship is used only instrumentally, the rule of law still requires
abstaining from arbitrary acts, including arbitrary removal of citizenship. However, non-arbitrariness
can be easily satisfied by some form of impact assessment or cost-benefit analysis and thus does not
provide a robust standard for protection against deprivation.
12. We discuss this possibility more extensively infra Part IV.C.4.
13. The opposition filed a motion in court that whenever it is elected to power it will revoke the
citizenship of any such investor. See Opposition warns buyers: Citizenship scheme is temporary-
Judicial protest filed, TIMES MALTA (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/2014
0127/local/opposition-warns-buyers-citizenship-scheme-is-temporary-judicial.504355.
14. TOMAS HAMMAR, DEMOCRACY AND THE NATION STATE: ALIENS, DENIZENS AND CITIZENS IN A
WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (1990); Peter J. Spiro, Dual Citizenship as a Human Right, 8
INT’L J. CONST. L. 11 (2010); THOMAS FAIST & PETER KIVISTO, DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE (Palgrave Macmillan, K. Hailbronner, D. Martin eds., 2007); RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF
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between this global trend and the strengthening of deprivation powers is that
multiple nationalities allow States to withdraw citizenship without creating
statelessness. As international law aims to proscribe deprivation when the
person concerned has no other citizenship, the new powers of deprivation
generally apply to dual nationals only.15 However, the dramatic increase in
the number of dual citizens among migrant origin populations makes
deprivation once again attractive for governments, even if they cannot apply
it to those who do not possess another nationality.
In the past, dual citizenship used to be regarded as an evil for States but
also for individuals because of cumulative duties that States could impose on
dual citizens such as tax and military service obligations. Over the last fifty
years, dual citizenship has come to be regarded as less of a problem for States
and as beneficial for individuals, especially because of the additional mobil-
ity rights that it conveys. We may be entering a third stage in which dual
citizenship can once again become a liability if States strengthen their powers
of citizenship deprivation while still respecting their duties to prevent
statelessness. Singular citizens would then be more secure in their member-
ship status than dual nationals. Targeting dual citizens for deprivation has,
however, deeply perverse effects even for the States engaging in these
policies. As Audrey Macklin points out, if both States of which a multiple
citizen suspected of terrorist activities is a national adopt such laws, then “it
becomes a race to see which country can strip citizenship first. To the loser
goes the citizen.”16 Citizenship deprivation then becomes a game of ‘passing
the buck,’ in which standards of judicial review and scrutiny are very likely to
be eroded for the sake of swift action in order to avoid becoming the dumping
ground for the other State’s terrorist suspects.
We must, however, not forget that public security threats or political
motives are not the only reasons why States deprive citizens of their status.
There are other justifications for deprivation, such as fraud in naturalization,
loss of citizenship by a relevant anchor person (spouse or parent), expiry of
citizenship after long-term residence abroad or loss in case of acquisition of a
foreign nationality. Except for the last justification, there is no clear interna-
tional trend and we have seen a number of countries in which changes have
happened in either direction.17
DUAL NATIONALS: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS (David A. Martin & Kay Hailbronner, eds., 2003);
Joachim Blatter, et al., Acceptance Of Dual Citizenship: Empirical Data And Political Contexts
(Universitat Luzern, Working Paper).
15. The 2014 U.K. law provides a notable exception by allowing for deprivation also in cases
where the government reasonably believes that another nationality could be obtained. See CAROLINE
SAWYER & HELENA WRAY, COUNTRY REPORT: UNITED KINGDOM, (European Univ. Inst. 2014),
available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33839/EUDO-CIT_2014_01_UK.pdf?
sequence1.
16. Audrey Macklin, Citizenship Revocation: The Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of
the Alien, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 1, 52 (2014).
17. While many European States have recently amended their laws to tolerate multiple citizen-
ships, since 2010 Slovakia withdraws citizenship from persons who have voluntarily acquired
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In contrast to most recent discussions by legal scholars and political
theorists, we will therefore not confine ourselves to analyzing normative
objections to deprivation in public security contexts. It seems at least prima
facie puzzling to provide strong defenses of citizenship status of those who
threaten public order in a fundamental way while granting States the power
to turn long-term resident citizens into stateless persons because of some flaw
in the naturalization procedure or to deprive their first generation emigrants
of citizenship on grounds of acquisition of a foreign nationality. Solving this
puzzle requires examining the underlying conceptions of membership in the
political community, some of which may reject the threat to public order as a
reason for deprivation but accept the rest. Although each of these reasons for
deprivation is permissible under international law, we want to scrutinize
them critically from normative political theory perspectives in order to arrive
at a more solid as well as nuanced defense of citizenship status against the
State’s deprivation powers.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS: GROUNDS AND PROCEDURES FOR LOSS
A normative evaluation of involuntary loss of citizenship needs to examine
both the grounds for deprivation and the procedures that bring about such
loss. Before doing so, we must distinguish involuntary loss from voluntary
renunciation, and explain the conditions under which restrictions on volun-
tary loss are permissible for the sake of strengthening citizenship as a durable
link between an individual and a State.
Distinctions between the different grounds and procedures for loss are not
always entirely obvious. In fact, as we will show, the basic conceptual
distinction between voluntary and involuntary loss depends heavily on
normative premises. Before we address this important point, we start with a
few purely terminological differentiations that we will presuppose in the rest
of this paper.
We use the terms deprivation and denationalization as synonyms for all
provisions of involuntary loss of citizenship or nationality. The term with-
drawal can also be used in this way, but we want to reserve it to indicate a
another nationality and since 2014 Russia fines those who fail to disclose that they possess another
citizenship. Since 2014 Canadian legislation requires declaration of intent for long-term residence as
a condition for naturalization, which could potentially provide a ground for deprivation if the person
takes residence abroad. See DAGMAR KUSA´, COUNTRY REPORT: SLOVAKIA, (European Univ. Inst.
2013), available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/admin/?pfile&applcountryProfiles&fSlovakia.pdf,
p. 22; See Russian Duma Considers Harsh Punishments for Dual citizenship, available at: http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/1099-russian-duma-considers-harsh-punishments-for-dual-
citizenship; See ELKE WINTER, COUNTRY REPORT: CANADA, (European Univ. Inst. 2013), available at
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/38289/EUDO_CIT_CR_2015_18.pdf?sequence1&isA
llowedy, p. 26; See eepaHI˘ aOH O pa	aHCTBe Pocc˘co˘ eepa
 (Federal Law
on Citizenship of Russian Federation), last amended Dec. 31, 2014, No 507-, CopaHe
aOHOaTeCTBa Pocc˘co˘ eepa
, 2015, N 1, p. 60, at s. 6.
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specific procedure of deprivation.18 We think that deprivation works better as
a generic synonym for involuntary loss since such loss results in a person
being deprived of the status, whereas withdrawal more plausibly refers to the
State action of taking away the status. In the case of ex lege loss, for which
we use the term lapse, the person is still deprived, although his status has not
been actively withdrawn by a decision of State authorities. Denaturalization
refers to the subset of cases where denationalization provisions aim at
reversing an acquisition through naturalization rather than through birthright.
Involuntary loss can be distinguished from voluntary loss by identifying
the agent that initiates a process resulting in a loss of citizenship with the
intention of bringing about this result. According to our definition, loss of
citizenship is voluntary only if it is intended and initiated by the individual
concerned. If the laws prescribe automatic loss when an individual performs
certain actions or no longer meets certain conditions, or if government
authorities or courts take a decision to deprive the individual of citizenship,
then such loss is involuntary. This definition is not normatively neutral. It is
based on an assumption that the burden of justification for the loss of
citizenship by an individual lies with the State. In this view, an action that an
individual undertakes and that is sanctioned by loss of citizenship cannot be
regarded as voluntary renunciation even if the individual is aware of this
possible consequence. In matters of citizenship loss, only an explicit request
by an individual can qualify a loss of citizenship as voluntary.
The distinction between voluntary and involuntary loss is systematically
blurred by the U.S. doctrine of expatriation, according to which certain
actions, such as service in a foreign army or return of naturalized citizens to
their country of origin, indicate intent to relinquish citizenship that leads to
the consequence of loss.19 The Supreme Court judgments in Nishikawa v.
Dulles20 and Afroyim v. Rusk21 effectively restricted the scope of this doctrine
in such a way that today nothing short of an explicit renunciation by the
individual counts as sufficient proof of intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship.
18. Art. 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights uses the term “deprivation” in as broad
a sense as we do. By contrast, the 1961 Convention on the Prevention of Statelessness uses the term
“loss” generically and “deprivation” when referring to withdrawal procedures. The 1997 European
Convention of Nationality does not employ either of these terms and uses only the general concept of
loss of nationality. We thank Gerard-Rene´ de Groot for alerting us to these terminological differences
in core documents of international law.
19. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471 (1986);
WEIL, supra note 4; Spiro, supra note 5, at 2172-73.
20. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958). The case involved a Japanese American who was
conscripted in the Japanese army nine months before the war between the two countries broke out.
After the war the State Department refused to issue him a passport, on the basis of statute explicitly
providing that anyone who has served in a foreign army should lose his citizenship. However the
Supreme Court accepted his defense that he was acting under duress, and it was for the government to
prove the opposite.
21. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). In Afroyim the Supreme Court went much further. The
case involved a naturalized American, who had voted in the Israeli elections, which was another
statutory ground for deprivation. The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow the
Government to shift, cancel or dilute its citizenship clause.
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The strong protection against deprivation enjoyed by U.S. citizens has thus
come about through judicial and administrative decisions without overturn-
ing the basic doctrine of expatriation. In contrast with this view, our
conception of democratic citizenship outlined in Part III does not allow for
‘tacit consent’ either in naturalization or in loss of citizenship. Just as
naturalization requires an explicit declaration or application by the indi-
vidual, so does renunciation. If a State deems an action of an individual as
indicating an intention of self-expatriation, this should be considered as
deprivation rather than as voluntary renunciation in order to clarify that the
burden of justification for the loss lies fully with the State.
The doctrine of expatriation is unacceptable because it considers loss as
voluntary even if it is not based on consent. The opposite view, which is just
as implausible, considers loss as involuntary as soon as individuals are not
fully free to choose between citizenship retention and renunciation. Restric-
tions of free choice are of two kinds: they can be imposed either by the State
whose citizenship is lost or by another State whose citizenship is acquired or
already held. Let us first consider conditions for renunciation imposed by the
State of citizenship. These make some individuals ineligible for renunciation
but do not thereby make the choice exercised by eligible individuals
involuntary. Conditions for renunciation or release create thus a potential for
involuntary retention rather than involuntary loss. Whether involuntary
retention is justifiable depends on the underlying normative conception of
citizenship.22 All liberal States must allow for voluntary loss under some
conditions. A doctrine of perpetual allegiance under which a State never
releases its citizens, which is common in the Arab States, is fundamentally
illiberal.23 By contrast, if a State imposes conditions such as residence abroad
and prior acquisition of a foreign nationality in order to prevent citizens
residing in the country from opting out of citizenship duties or citizens
abroad from becoming stateless, then such conditions can be regarded as fair
under most normative conceptions. To our knowledge, no current State
allows for completely unconstrained renunciation. A more complex question
is whether renunciation can still be considered voluntary when it is a
condition imposed by another State for acquisition of this State’s citizenship
or for access to public office that is reserved to singular citizens. We remain
agnostic about whether such restrictions make individual decisions about
naturalization involuntary, because we are here concerned only with the
relation between citizens and the State whose citizenship is lost, which
remains a voluntary decision as long as that State does not either deprive
22. See AUDREY MACKLIN, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP: A SLIPPERY CONCEPT 223–39
(R. Howard-Hassmann & M. Walton-Roberts eds., 2015).
23. See GIANLUCA PAROLIN, CITIZENSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD: KIN, RELIGION AND NATION-STATE
114 (2009).
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individuals of their citizenship against their will or deny them the right to
renounce it under fair conditions.
The next step in our conceptual analysis consists in identifying grounds for
citizenship loss. The European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizen-
ship (EUDO Citizenship) uses an inductive typology of fifteen grounds for
loss to compare citizenship laws.24 Voluntary renunciation forms in this
respect a single “mode of loss,” since the material ground is always the
intention of the individual as manifested through a declaration or request. For
the sake of our normative analysis of material grounds for loss, we group the
fourteen empirical grounds for withdrawal (excluding the residual category
“other reasons”) into five broader categories based on the assumed underly-
ing justifications. These are public security, non-compliance (with citizen-
ship duties), flawed acquisition, derivative loss (as a consequence of loss
incurred by an anchor person), and loss of genuine link.
Classifying deprivation provisions in citizenship laws according to these
grounds for loss does not always lead to unambiguous results since there is
significant overlap between the categories. For example, acquisition of a
foreign nationality may be considered as indicating a loss of genuine link or
as non-compliance with a duty of loyalty. It could also be interpreted as a
threat to public security if the foreign nationality is that of a hostile State. We
discuss this mode mainly under the loss of genuine link since this seems to us
the strongest and also the most widespread justification for restrictions on
dual citizenship after the demise of illiberal ideas about perpetual allegiance
and duties of loyalty.
There is one ground for loss that could be considered in addition to those
listed above. This is loss of conditional citizenship, which results in lapse or
withdrawal if the condition is not met. We can distinguish three manifesta-
tions of conditional citizenship:
a) Preliminary or probationary citizenship: a status acquired some time
before full citizenship is granted depending on additional conditions that
must be met during that period, e.g. uninterrupted residence, clean criminal
record, performance of civic duties. In the United Kingdom, the government
of Gordon Brown had proposed a probationary citizenship status of this kind,
but the proposal was shelved in 2010 by the coalition government led by
David Cameron. Since our focus is on the acquisition and loss of a
citizenship status that is also recognized as nationality under international
law, we consider probationary citizenship as merely an additional naturaliza-
tion requirement. A failure to acquire full citizenship would thus not be
included in our discussion of loss of citizenship status.
b) Temporary citizenship: a status of full citizenship needs to be recon-
firmed at a later point in time, with additional conditions that must be met in
24. See Comparing Citizenship Laws: Loss of Citizenship, EUR. UNIV. INST., http://eudo-citizenship.
eu/databases/modes-of-loss (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Comparing Citizenship].
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order to retain the status. The legislation adopted in 1999 in Germany, which
introduced a duty for ius soli children to renounce an inherited foreign
citizenship before age twenty-three if they did not want to lose their German
one, illustrates such conditionality.25 In 2014, the legislation was relaxed to
exempt those children who have resided in Germany for eight years or have
attended school for six years.26 Thus, the new regime can be interpreted as
deprivation on the ground of loss of genuine link. There are also provisions
for temporary ius sanguinis in several European States requiring that children
born abroad to citizen parents must return or request retention of citizenship
after reaching the age of majority.27 These latter provisions are clearly
motivated by a genuine link concern and will be discussed under this
heading.
c) Citizenship in jeopardy: a status of full citizenship is granted without
any time limit, but citizenship acquired in this way is subject to specific
grounds for deprivation that are not applied to other citizens. The main
example in European States is discrimination against naturalized citizens in
Cyprus, Ireland and Malta by threatening them with deprivation if they take
up permanent residence abroad, whereas no such jeopardy exists for birth-
right citizens.28 This conditionality can be interpreted as motivated by
concerns about loyalty or genuine links.
One may wonder why the five grounds for deprivation are the only ones
that are fairly common in democratic States. Why does no country deprive
citizens of their status for, say, murder or other acts more heinous than fraud
or foreign public service? Even treason is in many countries no ground for
deprivation—in the United States, one must be a citizen to be convicted for
treason.29 It is interesting that deprivation provisions are not proportionate to
the moral blameworthiness of conduct that triggers the loss. Although
denationalization can be a very severe penalty, it is not an instrument of
criminal law the primary purpose of which is punishment. Citizenship
deprivation aims instead at asserting the conditions for membership status.
We must therefore evaluate the grounds for deprivation against the back-
ground of a normative theory of membership in liberal democratic States.
Where secondary purposes become the drivers of deprivation policies, as we
have argued is the case when deprivation is used as an instrument for
25. In other States, such as Austria, a much shorter period of temporary citizenship exists for
certain naturalization applicants who are granted citizenship under the condition that they prove
renunciation of a foreign citizenship within a certain time.
26. Anuscheh Farahat, German Parliament adopts the new bill on the ‘option duty’, EUDO
CITIZENSHIP OBSERVATORY, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/1195-german-parliament-
adopts-the-new-bill-on-option-duty (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
27. In Europe, such temporary ius sanguinis provisions exist in Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Sweden and Switzerland. See the results for ‘Residence abroad’ L02 in Comparing
Citizenship, supra note 24.
28. Id.
29. Spiro, supra note 5, at 2184.
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removing citizens who are terrorist suspects, the underlying conception of
membership is affected indirectly. Yet in spite of the apparent “return of
banishment”30 in such contexts, deprivation no longer serves the purposes
of criminal justice that had been at the forefront in earlier periods of history
when States lacked capacities to incarcerate criminals and resorted more
often to capital punishment or banishment as less costly alternatives.31
The final step is a categorization of loss procedures. In order to reduce
complexity, we do not take into account, at this stage, important procedural
aspects such as administrative process or the availability of judicial review or
remedies.32 Instead we consider merely how actions by the State and the
individual relate to each other in determining the loss of citizenship.
In voluntary renunciation, the individual always initiates the loss. Yet this
initiative need not be sufficient to bring about the desired result. We can thus
distinguish two procedures for renunciation: by declaration or by release.
This distinction mirrors a similar distinction between naturalization by
declaration or by discretionary administrative decision. In the former case,
the individual has the sole power to bring about the loss, whereas in the latter
case, the government needs to agree to a citizen’s request or application to be
released. The distinction between these two procedures can become blurred
to a certain extent through material conditions for renunciation, which
include not only long-term residence abroad and access to or possession of
another citizenship but also completion of military service and absence of tax
and private debts, or pending criminal charges. However, at least in Europe,
we are not aware of states where release is actually discretionary, allowing
refusal for citizens who fulfill the material conditions.33 This is a fundamen-
tal protection provided by the rule of law that is likely to be absent in
authoritarian States and that is stronger for voluntary renunciation than for
ordinary naturalization, which remains more often discretionary in liberal
democracies.
There are three distinct legal procedures for deprivation. It can occur
automatically as a direct effect of a legal provision (ex lege), it can result
from a decision taken by state authorities (who are empowered by law to take
this decision), or it can be the effect of declaring a prior acquisition of
citizenship invalid. We follow the EUDO Citizenship terminology and
30. See Audrey Macklin, The Return of Banishment: Do the New Denationalisation Policies
Weaken Citizenship?, EUDO CITIZENSHIP OBSERVATORY, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/commentaries/
citizenship-forum/1268-the-return-of-banishment-do-the-new-denationalisation-policies-weaken-
citizenship (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
31. See Benjamin Gray, From Exile of Citizens to Deportation of Non-Citizens: Ancient Greece
as a Mirror to Illuminate a Modern Transition, 15 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 565, 565 (2011); M.J. Gibney,
Should Citizenship Be Conditional? The Ethics of Denationalization, 75 J. POL. 646, 646 (2013).
32. See Gerard-Rene´ de Groot & Maarten Peter Vink, Best Practices in Involuntary Loss of
Nationality in the EU, 73 CEPS PAPERS LIBERTY & SECURITY EUR. 1 (2014).
33. See the results for ‘Renunciation of citizenship’ L01 in Comparing Citizenship, supra note
24.
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identify these three procedures of deprivation as lapse, withdrawal and
nullification.
Nullification is today nearly exclusively applied in cases where the
acquisition is seen to be flawed, but it is not the dominant procedure for this
ground for loss. A majority of European States use withdrawal procedures
instead. Nullification often means that citizenship is invalidated retroactively
(ex tunc), but it may also take effect only ex nunc, in which case the State
does not deny that citizenship acquisition has had legal effect even where the
acquisition was flawed. Flawed acquisition can occur for different reasons,
including errors committed by the authorities that award citizenship, errors
committed by the person acquiring citizenship (or other persons, such as
parents and spouses, applying for citizenship on the person’s behalf), or fraud
(i.e. intentional non-compliance with conditions or procedures by the person
acquiring citizenship or others acting on her behalf). We also consider
abusive award of citizenship by public authorities a form of flawed acquisi-
tion. These distinctions matter and will be discussed further in Part IV
because the determination of loss in a liberal citizenship regime must account
for moral culpability, even if withdrawal does not serve the primary purpose
of punishment.
Among the remaining four grounds—public security, non-compliance,
derivative loss and loss of genuine link—we hardly find any nullification
procedures in the laws of the states monitored by EUDO Citizenship.
However, during the first half of the twentieth century, naturalization in the
United States was commonly regarded as involving a character judgment
about future behavior and loyalty. “Anti-American” political activities or
permanent return of a naturalized American to her country of origin were
then considered as demonstrating that the State had committed an error of
judgment when granting citizenship. In such cases, deprivation on grounds of
public security or loss of genuine link was often equated to nullification,
which corrected this error and in some cases even had retroactive effect.34
Potentially, nullification procedures could be applied to any reason for
denationalization, including derivative loss (e.g. if it turns out that ius
sanguinis citizenship had been wrongly derived from a parent who acquired
citizenship by fraud), or loss of conditional citizenship (e.g. if there is a
condition of later renunciation of a foreign citizenship but the originally
acquired citizenship is nullified due to fraud).
While nullification has become rare except in the case of fraud, lapse or
withdrawal procedures of loss are fairly evenly distributed among other
grounds for deprivation across European states. It is possible for states either
to declare that citizenship will be lost automatically if one of these conditions
are met or to establish a procedure under which authorities investigate and
34. See WEIL, supra note 4.
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make case-by-case decisions. Both European and American states apply
deprivation by either withdrawal or lapse for each of these grounds for loss.35
In our normative discussion, we will argue that a strong presumption against
the power of states to deprive citizens of their status implies that, where there
are justified reasons for deprivation, the procedure should generally be
withdrawal rather than lapse. However, we will consider for each ground for
loss whether there are special reasons that make lapse procedures preferable.
III. NORMATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
DEPRIVATION
The political theory literature on citizenship has overwhelmingly focused
on naturalization of immigrants. Acquisition by birth through ius sanguinis
or ius soli has received comparatively little attention, except insofar as ius
sanguinis and ius soli have come to be associated with ethnic and civic types
of nationalism, respectively. The literature has focused on loss of citizenship
through renunciation or deprivation even less. This selective consideration
may be due to the fact that political theorists tend to reflect on issues of public
concern in the societies where they live, which tend to be countries of
immigration.36 But ignoring birthright and citizenship loss also shows that
political theorists tend to take for granted that citizenship is a stable lifelong
membership for individuals and is automatically reproduced across genera-
tions through birthright. This assumption is specifically challenged when
states deprive citizens of their status without consent.
As discussed in Part I, the contemporary revival of interest among
normative legal and political theorists in citizenship deprivation was trig-
gered by Western democratic states’ policies in response to home-grown
terrorism. Most authors’ methods of analysis consist in assessing deprivation
policies against international human rights and domestic rule of law stan-
dards, such as prevention of statelessness, non-arbitrariness with regard to
justifications and judicial remedies, or non-discrimination between different
categories of citizens.37 Some also point out a lack of proportionality by
casting doubt on the effectiveness of deprivation in achieving the proclaimed
goals of averting terrorist threats to public security.38
35. See Comparing Citizenship, supra note 24.
36. Rainer Baubo¨ck, Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism, 37 INT’L MIGRA-
TION REV. 700 (2003).
37. For exemplary normative critiques of United Kingdom and Canadian deprivation policies
along these lines see Matthew J. Gibney, A Very Transcendental Power: Denaturalisation and the
Liberalisation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom, 61 POL. STUD. 637 (2013); Rayner Thwaites,
The Security of Citizenship? Finnis in the Context of the United Kingdom’s Citizenship Stripping
Provisions, in ALLEGIANCE AND IDENTITY IN A GLOBALISED WORLD 243 (Fiona Jenkins et al. eds.,
2014).
38. See Macklin, supra note 16.
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Shai Lavi takes a different route by suggesting that deprivation policies are
rooted in national conceptions of citizenship.39 He distinguishes a British
security-based approach from an American one of citizenship as a social
contract and an Israeli approach to citizenship as an ethno-national bond. We
have some doubts about a “national models” approach to the comparative
study of citizenship because it tends to ignore the multiple purposes of
citizenship laws and the multiple domestic and international drivers of
citizenship reforms.40 We agree, however, with Lavi that deprivation should
be normatively assessed against a conception of citizenship that can be
defended from within broader theories of justice and democracy. Such a
conception would have to be sufficiently general to be applicable to different
national contexts and acceptable to different constitutional traditions.
Lavi himself suggests such a conception of citizenship as a horizontal
relation of civic allegiance within a self-governing polity as a fourth
alternative to the three models he identifies. We also propose a fourfold
typology of basic conceptions of citizenship, but these are not associated
with any stable and coherent national models. Instead we find them instanti-
ated in different legal provisions in citizenship laws that can be simultane-
ously present or change over time.
These four types emerge from distinguishing, on one dimension, whether
state or individual interests dominate in the attribution or change of citizen-
ship status and, on the second dimension, whether citizenship is based on a
generic or special relationship between the individual and the state. Of course
citizenship status, once established, always entails a special relationship of
rights and duties between a state and an individual. What we want to capture
with our distinction is whether a prior special relationship between an
individual and a state provides the reason for attributing citizenship status.
This is the case where citizenship is derived from birth in the territory or
parental citizenship or where naturalization depends on prior residence in the
state’s territory. It is also the case where individuals are awarded citizenship
for special services, such as serving in the army or for exceptional contribu-
tions to the state. If there is no such special relationship that provides a
ground for citizenship, then the relationship is generic in the sense that states
are more or less free to select individuals as citizens or that individuals are
more or less free to select states of which they want to become citizens. The
“more or less” clause is necessary because states will always define condi-
tions for the acquisition of citizenship. Conditions such as minimum age,
financial resources or payments, minimum education, or special skills con-
39. Shai Lavi, Punishment and the Revocation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom, United
States, and Israel, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 404 (2010).
40. For critiques see Maarten Peter Vink & Rainer Baubo¨ck, Citizenship Configurations:
Analysing the Multiple Purposes of Citizenship Regimes in Europe, 11 COMP. EUR. POL. 621 (2013);
Jan Willem Duyvendak et al., Mysterious Multiculturalism: The Risks of Using Model-Based Indices
for Making Meaningful Comparisons, 11 COMP. EUR. POL. 599 (2013).
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strain eligibility for citizenship but do not refer to a special relationship
between the individual and the state before the acquisition of citizenship.
If citizenship is grounded in a pre-existing special relationship, it is more
likely to be regarded as intrinsically valuable as an expression of a bond
between the individual and polity. In other words, individuals will be seen as
having an interest in membership itself. If the relationship is instead consid-
ered generic, then citizenship will have primarily instrumental value in the
pursuit of other interests.41 For example, states may use naturalization rules
as an immigration policy tool in order to select economically desirable
immigrants or restrict family reunification, while individuals may change
citizenship in order to gain additional mobility rights or to escape legal duties
of taxation and military service.
The four conceptions of citizenship that result from combining these
binary distinctions on the two dimensions can be identified as “state discre-
tion” versus “individual choice” if the relationship is conceptualized as
generic and identified as “ascriptive community” versus “genuine link” if it is
conceptualized as special. We will discuss below only versions of these
conceptions that can be regarded as liberal and democratic in a broad sense
and that apply to contemporary states and the international state system.
In Table 1 in the Annex, the horizontal distinction between State and
individual interests is conceptualized as a scale rather than as a dichotomy.
As explained above, acquisition and loss of citizenship always involve the
interests of both states and individuals, and every liberal conception must
allow for individuals to exercise choice with regard to naturalization and
renunciation. The difference is thus one between the predominance of either
actor in the citizenship relationship. Our substantive hypothesis is that the
distance between normative conceptions in which state or individual interests
predominate is greater if the citizenship relationship is generic and smaller if
it is special. A special relationship implies not only that those involved
mutually affect each other’s interests but also that they have special duties to
consider each other’s interests. We assume therefore that state discretion and
individual choice conceptions tend to be more strongly oriented towards
either state or individual interests, whereas ascriptive community and genu-
ine link conceptions represent mixed-interest approaches and thus share
more common traits. Now, we briefly characterize each of these ideal-typical
and normative models and consider their general implications for the loss of
citizenship.
(1) State discretion: The first conception regards the sovereign power of
states to determine their own citizens not merely as a principle of interna-
tional law that applies in relations with other states but also as an element of
41. As Audrey Macklin has pointed out to us, instrumental and non-instrumental reasons for
membership policies are often mixed and hard to separate. Our claim here is merely that special
relations conceptions will give primacy to non-instrumental reasons.
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their internal democratic self-determination. State discretion therefore primar-
ily means legislative discretion. A democratically legitimate legislature
should be broadly free to set the rules not only for citizenship acquisition but
also for deprivation in accordance with its political goals and in a way that it
considers conducive to the public good, within constraints of constitutional
and international law that the legislature has itself freely accepted. Executive
and administrative discretion will often, but not always, enhance the freedom
of state representatives in pursuing what they perceive to be state interests.
The United Kingdom, with its lack of a written constitution and the principle
of parliamentary sovereignty, provides the best setting for this conception,
but the normative idea that citizenship policies should primarily serve the
goals of the State represented by a democratically legitimate government is
strongly present in public debates in many other countries too. State discre-
tion can be used to offer citizenship to persons whose admission is deemed to
be in the public interest but who have no particular ties to the political
community. It is also widely used in naturalization procedures in order to
retain state power to reject candidates for citizenship that would otherwise be
eligible. Frequently, discretion is exercised indirectly through administrative
procedures that delay access or deter eligible persons from applying.42 With
regard to involuntary loss, as we will argue in Part IV.A below, public
security grounds for deprivation can be most easily supported from within a
state discretion view of the citizenship relationship. These grounds serve to
justify both wide legislative and administrative discretion. The other material
grounds for deprivation are less suitable for justifying administrative discre-
tion, since they refer mostly to facts that can be established objectively.
However, a view that state powers in determining their citizens should be
constrained as little as possible generates the widest scope for legislative
discretion and the greatest insecurity of citizenship status overall, and it can
thus also be invoked in justifying extensive loss provisions on any of these
other grounds.
(2) Individual choice: The second conception represents a contrasting
view. It considers citizenship as an individual entitlement that is held against
the State and thus limits the scope of the State’s deprivation powers. The
underlying normative view is to think of citizenship as a foundation of
individual autonomy analogous to individual property that the State must
protect and of which it cannot deprive its citizens without losing legitimacy.
This essentially Lockean conception of citizenship underlies the above-cited
judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court that made it practically impossible for
42. See THOMAS HUDDLESTON, THE NATURALISATION PROCEDURE: MEASURING THE ORDINARY
OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMMIGRANTS TO BECOME CITIZENS (EUI Policy Paper RSCAS
PP 2013/16), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/28122/RSCAS_PP_2013_
16.pdf?sequence1.
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the U.S. government to strip citizens of their membership status.43 Again, the
idea that citizenship is an individual right held against the state is also
widespread in other contexts. It is closely associated with a de-lege-ferenda
interpretation of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration as establishing a
positive right to nationality and also with views that individuals have a right
to choose their own identities, which implies an option to acquire multiple
citizenships.44
Obviously, in the current world, individuals cannot pick and choose the
citizenship of any State they are interested in. There are still four practical
implications of an individual choice view. First, under this conception, State
discretion ought to be limited both in the sense that citizenship laws should
be minimally selective on grounds of special relations and in the sense that
administrations should have as little discretion as possible in rejecting
applicants. Citizenship acquisition becomes then an entitlement for anybody
who is interested and eligible, but it should never be imposed on adult
individuals without their consent. Second, States should not merely tolerate
dual citizenship but allow the widest feasible choices for combining different
citizenships. Third, unless they become stateless, individuals should be free
to renounce their citizenships whenever they want without the constraint of
having to abandon their residence in the country or other conditions. Fourth,
States should have minimal powers to strip individuals of their citizenship
against their will.
While an individual choice conception provides strong conceptual reasons
for minimizing the deprivation powers of States, it cannot fully ignore the
interests of States. Even under this conception it would be difficult to argue
that citizenship cannot be withdrawn if it has been acquired unlawfully.
There may also be other reasons for accepting in some cases involuntary loss
of citizenship. For example, if a State offers citizenship to non-residents who
choose to invest in the country, would it not be entitled to withdraw
citizenship if a promised investment fails to materialize? If a State sells its
citizenship for a certain price, could it not also take it away under conditions
that are similar to those for legitimate expropriation, i.e. if there is a
sufficiently strong public interest and the persons concerned are compensated
by receiving back their initial payment? These questions highlight that
thinking of citizenship by analogy with property and contract based on
mutual interest rather than as a special relation may inadvertently open the
door to deprivation in cases where a special-relation view would bar
acquisition in the first place and could also raise objections to deprivation if a
sufficiently strong relation has developed over time.
43. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Macklin, supra note 22.
44. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUAL-
ISM (1999); Spiro, supra note 14; Dimitry Kochenov, EU Citizenship without Duties, 20 EUR. L.J. 482
(2014).
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(3) Ascriptive community: The third and fourth conceptions consider
citizenship based on a special relation between individuals and States. An
ascriptive relation is one in which neither side exercises much choice.
Citizenship is attributed to individuals by the State but based on objective
criteria. The most obvious illustration is provided by the two modes of
acquisition by birth, i.e. ius sanguinis and ius soli that generally lead to ex
lege attribution. Individuals may have marginal opportunities of choice with
regard to birthright citizenship, for example whether to register a child born
abroad as a citizen by descent, and States may exercise some administrative
discretion by facilitating or hindering certification of birthright citizenship. It
is also possible to construct residence-based naturalization as ascription
through automatic ius domicilii. In fact, involuntary attribution of nationality
after some time of residence was not uncommon until the mid-19th
century when many States considered foreign residents subjects over whom
they claimed full sovereign powers against countries of origin.45 A strictly
ascriptive conception of loss would imply that birthright citizenship can
never be withdrawn or renounced whereas automatic residential citizenship
would lead to automatic loss as an effect of permanent emigration. Among
contemporary democratic States, there is no more automatic ius domicilii and
birthright citizenship is complemented by individual opportunities to change
citizenship status through naturalization and renunciation. In this context,
ascription becomes a feature of ethno-national conceptions of citizenship, but
not only of these. In fact, an ascriptive conception is deeply ingrained in all
modern citizenship laws that invariably attribute citizenship automatically at
birth.
There are two normative justifications for automatic citizenship attribu-
tion. First, it is better able to prevent statelessness than the other conceptions,
since it removes the determination of status as far as possible from self-
interested choices of States and individuals. Second, birthright ascription
secures the continuity of the citizenry across generations, which may be a
critical condition for democratic stability and social solidarity among
citizens.46
The implications of an ascriptive view for citizenship deprivation are
somewhat ambiguous. Ascriptive citizenship communities can be based on
immutable identity features, such as descent or birthplace; on beliefs that can
in principle be changed but are generally transmitted across generations, such
as religion or secular values; or on situational features, such as shared
residence. In a strictly ascriptive model, citizenship loss would not occur, as
45. For example, in Austria automatic naturalization of foreigners after ten years of residence
was abolished only in 1833. See JOACHIM STERN & GERD VALCHARS, COUNTRY REPORT: AUSTRIA 4
(Eur. Univ. Inst. 2013), available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/admin/?pfile&applcountry
Profiles&f2013-28-Austria.pdf.
46. See Ranier Baubo¨ck, Boundaries and Birthright: Bosniak’s and Shachar’s Critiques of
Liberal Citizenship, 9 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1 (2011).
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neither the State nor the individual would be able to directly change a
citizenship status.47 In current liberal democracies, however, persons can
change their citizenship status directly and voluntarily through naturalization
and renunciation. In this context, it is no longer obvious whether a State
aiming to strengthen ascriptive membership should preserve the integrity of
the community through stripping the citizenship of those who do not fit. If
membership in a community were based on shared values, then it might expel
those whose actions violate its values in a way that seriously jeopardizes
them. If the community’s citizenship is, however, based on birthright or
residence, then it would be inconsistent to strip citizens of their status
because of their value-threatening behavior. Moreover, for a community
based on liberal values, not expelling those who betray these through their
actions may be necessary precisely for the sake of upholding these values and
assuming responsibility for punishing those who violate them.48
The most plausible implication of an ascriptive conception of citizenship is
that it lends itself to drawing distinctions between citizens by ascription and
by choice, and it allows for banishment of the latter category in cases where
their actions demonstrate disloyalty or seriously threaten public interests.
Since all current citizenship laws are based on birthright ascription, this
amounts to a distinction between citizens by birth and by naturalization with
regard to conditions for involuntary loss, which undermines equality of the
status itself and is prohibited by Article 5(2) of the European Convention on
Nationality.
(4) Genuine link: The fourth conception starts from the interests of
individuals, as does the individual choice view, but it considers citizenship
grounded in a special relation, as does the ascriptive view. In this view,
citizenship is based on a ‘genuine link,’ as famously asserted in the 1955
Nottebohm judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).49 The ICJ
was mainly concerned with avoiding conflicts between States resulting from
abusive naturalizations,50 and refrained from establishing a positive duty to
award citizenship to persons who had genuine links to the State. Such a
positive interpretation has, however, been suggested by liberal political
theorists51 and it can be frequently found in public debates on immigrants’
claims to naturalization. Recently, a genuine link conception has even been
invoked as an objection against abusive attribution by the European Parlia-
47. Such change could, however, come about indirectly in belief-based and situational communi-
ties as an effect of a change of individual beliefs or residence.
48. See Macklin, supra note 30 (citing Rainer Baubo¨ck, Whose Bad Guys Are Terrorists?, EUDO
CITIZENSHIP OBSERVATORY, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-forum/citizenship-
forum-cat/1268-the-return-of-banishment-do-the-new-denationalisation-policies-weaken-citizenship?
showall&start7 (last visited Jan. 23, 2016)).
49. Liechtenstein v. Guatemala (Nottebohm), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
50. See Robert Sloane, Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal
Regulation of Nationality, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 53 (2009).
51. See, e.g., CARENS, supra note 7.
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ment and Commission in criticizing schemes that would put citizenship in
EU Member States, and thus also EU citizenship itself, up for sale.52
Normative arguments for a genuine link conception point out that demo-
cratic citizenship should be neither under-inclusive nor over-inclusive. In a
neo-republican interpretation, individuals are subject to arbitrary political
domination if they have genuine links to the political community but remain
involuntarily excluded from citizenship, whereas including outsiders who do
not have any genuine link introduces a collective form of domination by
undermining the capacity of the citizens to govern themselves.53
A genuine link conception is implied in many of the conditions for
citizenship acquisition, most obviously in residence conditions for ordinary
naturalization, in conditional ius soli, which requires either parental resi-
dence status or becomes effective only after a certain time of residence of the
child, and in restrictions on iure sanguinis transmission of citizenship to third
or later generations born abroad. In a genuine link conception, renunciation
of citizenship will be conditional upon residence abroad (in addition to
access to another citizenship) and involuntary deprivation will be generally
justified on the basis of loss of a genuine link while all other grounds will be
considered suspect.
Our own normative assessment of the material grounds for deprivation is
generally grounded in a genuine link conception of citizenship. However, in
order to apply to nationality as a legal status in the international system of
States, such a conception needs to be interpreted broadly in a way that takes
into account some basic and normatively justifiable features of this system.
Among these we count birthright attribution of citizenship, individual con-
sent in naturalization and renunciation, the prevention of statelessness, and
normative commitments to peaceful and friendly international relations.
In mobile societies, being born in a State territory or to citizen parents are
highly imperfect indicators for a genuine link, since children may leave their
country of birth or never take up residence in their parents’ country of
citizenship. However, without birthright attribution, the nature of the politi-
cal community would change radically. Birthright is not so much justified as
an approximation of genuine link,54 but as a stabilizing mechanism for the
political community whose members consider each other connected through
citizenship links that they acquire automatically at birth, and continually
retain even if they emigrate. Ascriptive citizenship can in this way be
reconciled with a genuine link conception if it is qualified by conditions that
prevent over- and under-inclusiveness.
52. See infra Part V.
53. See Rainer Baubo¨ck, The Rights and Duties of External Citizenship, 13 CITIZENSHIP STUD.
475 (2009).
54. See, e.g., CARENS, supra note 7, at 44.
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Since a genuine link conception starts from claims of individuals to
membership, it can also provide qualified support for some implications of an
individual choice view. Automatic attribution to adults without their consent
would be contrary to democracy as collective self-government authorized by
autonomous individuals. Naturalization must thus remain a choice exercised
by individuals who are entitled to claim membership because of genuine
links.55 Similarly, those who are no longer subject to the territorial jurisdic-
tion of a State but remain presumptively lifelong citizens should not be
deprived automatically but should be free to renounce their citizenship of
origin.
The prevention of statelessness is normatively important not only from a
human rights perspective but also from a neo-republican one because
statelessness remains an extremely precarious position that exposes individu-
als to arbitrary domination and interference with their fundamental rights.
This basis is strong enough to justify the award of citizenship to individuals
who may not have prior strong ties to a State. In contrast, a genuine link
perspective would not consider citizenship as fungible.56 If citizenship is
based on a special relation, then it is not enough to assign responsibilities for
the protection of fundamental human rights to one or the other State. No State
to which an individual is connected through genuine links should be able to
shift that responsibility to another State, even if the individual also has the
necessary relevant ties.
Finally, a genuine link perspective also provides arguments for why States
should not be permitted to externalize security risks by banishing criminal or
terrorist citizens to other States through depriving them of their citizenship
status. This practice does not only violate standards of friendly relations
between States, but it also undermines the genuine link principle itself by
imposing the State’s responsibility for its own bad citizens on other States.
We conclude this Part by considering how the four normative conceptions
would evaluate the three deprivation procedures (i.e. lapse, withdrawal and
nullification). As discussed above, the legislative choice of procedure de-
pends to a certain degree on the prior choice of material grounds for
deprivation. The underlying conception of citizenship could thus make a
difference also for the prevalence of a certain procedure across several modes
of deprivation. This makes it possible and useful to consider the effects of
deprivation procedures on the relation between the citizen and the State from
a normative perspective.
Intuitively, one could think that lapse is the most favored procedure under
an ascriptive conception, since it most strongly limits discretion, while
55. Ruth Rubio-Marı´n defends the contrasting view that the collective interest of a democratic
polity in including long-term residents as citizens overrides the right of immigrants to choose. See
RUTH RUBIO-MAR´IN, IMMIGRATION AS A DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE: CITIZENSHIP AND INCLUSION IN
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (2000).
56. See Macklin, supra note 30.
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withdrawal is more appropriate from a State discretion view, since it requires
State authorities to decide whether to take action. Yet this is a too formalistic
interpretation. Assuming a given set of legally specified material conditions,
discretionary naturalization enhances the powers of administrative authori-
ties to reject eligible applicants. With regard to deprivation, the opposite is
true. Withdrawal procedures strengthen the position of the citizen faced with
a deprivation threat for two reasons. First, only a positive action by the
authority can bring about the loss of citizenship and the authority may be
unwilling or lack the resources to take such action. Second, even if the
authority decides to withdraw, the person concerned is more likely to find
legal remedies against withdrawal compared to a situation where the same
conditions lead to ex lege loss.
An extensive use of lapse procedures is therefore especially problematic
from an individual choice perspective since it denies the citizen agency in
decisions about his or her status whereas it might be somewhat paradoxically
preferred under a State discretion view. The paradox can be dissolved if we
remember that our definition of State discretion refers primarily to the
freedom of legislatures to determine who are the citizens of the State.
Democratic legislators have greater power in this matter if they are free to lay
down conditions in the law that will automatically entail a loss of citizenship
compared to a situation where public administrations and courts may have
the last word on how a withdrawal procedure should be implemented in a
particular case.
As discussed above, ascriptive conceptions of citizenship should generally
be averse to deprivation, except if citizenship has been acquired by naturalization.
On the ascriptive view, there should be broad discretion in naturalization
procedures in order to properly assess the degree of individual assimilation
into the birthright community. This makes it more likely that vague legisla-
tion that allows for broad executive as well as administrative discretion will
also be used in denaturalization.
The implications of a genuine link conception on the choice of procedure
are less obvious. On the one hand, there are good reasons not to entrust State
authorities with exclusive power to define the criteria that indicate a loss of
genuine link. In contrast with ascriptive membership, genuine links may be
confirmed through individual actions. As an illustration we can consider the
Finnish, Swedish, and Danish laws, which all foresee that citizens who were
born abroad and have never resided in these countries under circumstances
that indicate a special tie will lose their inherited nationality at age twenty-
two, unless they take up residence or make a request for retention before that
age. The procedure is in all three countries formally a lapse of citizenship.
However, the Swedish practice seems to be much more like withdrawal in its
effect, since it is more generous in exercising discretion in favor of granting
such requests as compared to Danish practice, where many more external
Danish citizens are deprived as a result. Finland, moreover, provides for an
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opportunity of reacquisition based on effective links for those who have lost
their citizenship at age twenty-two.57 One might consider the Danish practice
more in line with a genuine link conception since it prevents over-
inclusiveness through automatic deprivation in cases where there is no
presumption of a genuine link. One could, however, also support the Swedish
and Finnish practice by pointing out that the very act of making a request for
retention provides some, even if not sufficient, evidence for a genuine link.
Second generations born abroad who are also citizens of their native
countries may or may not be connected to their parents’ country of origin. A
request for retention after the age of majority may be a good self-selection
device indicating the strength of their links, and an opportunity of reacquisi-
tion will help to avoid unfair exclusion of those who decide to return only at a
later age.
A normative evaluation of nullification procedures should vary much less
across the four conceptions of citizenship if we consider only their liberal
versions. From a liberal perspective, nullification cannot be justified for any
reason other than unlawful acquisition. Moreover, the grounds for declaring
acquisition unlawful must be specified narrowly and clearly in the law. For
example, concealing a criminal record may lead to declaring the naturaliza-
tion of an applicant unlawful if a clean criminal record was a condition for
naturalization. By contrast, taking an oath of loyalty in a naturalization
ceremony should not lead to nullification on grounds of later actions that are
regarded as proof of disloyalty, since liberal States cannot determine whether
such an oath was taken sincerely at the time and should not interpret a
ceremonial oath as indicating whether acquisition of citizenship was lawful.
If acquisition of citizenship is later found to be unlawful based on facts that
had been present but were not yet known at the time of award, there does not
seem to be any obvious objections against nullification from the State
discretion, the individual choice, or the ascriptive views. The genuine link
view, however, provides one strong qualification. Unlawful acquisition will
often lead to de facto citizenship (i.e. a situation a situation in which both the
individual and the State are engaged in an ongoing citizenship relation and
exercise their respective rights and duties). If such a situation lasts for a
sufficiently long time, it creates a genuine link that amounts to membership
in the political community in spite of its legally tainted origin. In such cases,
the genuine link view still does not provide an argument against an objec-
tively established fact of unlawful acquisition, but it does provide a strong
reason against nullifying the legal effects of subsequent de facto citizenship.
The proper procedure in this case is therefore at most a threat of withdrawal
that does not entail loss ex tunc, that can be legally fought by the individual
57. Oral communication by Eva Ersbøll, October 2014; see also SAMPO BRANDER & JESSICA
FAGERLUND, COUNTRY REPORT: FINLAND 28 (Eur. Univ. Inst. 2013), available at http://eudo-citizenship.
eu/docs/CountryReports/Finland.pdf.
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and that provides for permanent residence status with an option of newly
acquiring full citizenship.58 This should be combined with a statute of
limitations that automatically recognizes even unlawfully acquired citizen-
ship after a certain number of years.
IV. GROUNDS FOR DEPRIVATION
We turn now to the most common grounds for deprivation in the EU
Member States, which we shall analyze in light of the normative conceptions
set out in the preceding Parts. As we have already argued that the normatively
recommended procedure is withdrawal (rather than lapse or nullification), we
consider the substantive grounds on the general assumption that they are
applied by legislative authorization but with a certain measure of discretion,
so that due account of the circumstances of each individual case is taken.
With regard to some of the grounds we still discuss the possible justification
for lapse (i.e. automatic loss that leaves no scope for discretion).
A. Public Security
Most European countries have some provisions for citizenship withdrawal
from persons who have acted or intended to act against the security of their
State. These provisions are easy to justify under the State discretion view.
Indeed, the British government made precisely this argument in its push for
new powers of the Home Secretary to deprive native-born Britons of their
citizenship. By contrast, public security is not an acceptable ground for
deprivation under the individual choice conception, according to which the
State has a duty to prosecute and punish those citizens who have gravely
endangered its security, but should not have the power to sever the link with
its citizens. Similarly, under both special relationship conceptions, dangerous
citizens should remain citizens. If citizenship is grounded in a pre-existing
special relation, this relation is not broken when a citizen becomes a public
security threat. The ascriptive community view will, however, allow for wide
deprivation powers towards naturalized citizens, since their membership
status can be regarded as undeserved if they become a threat to public
security. Their deprivation could then be construed as a nullification of
naturalization rather than a loss of a previously valid membership in a
birthright community.
Our objections to the instrumental use of citizenship apply fully to public
security grounds for deprivation. Ironically, if citizenship deprivation is
primarily regarded as a tool of criminal punishment, additional arguments
against these practices may emerge. Since offences against public security
58. Gerard-Rene´ de Groot & Patrick Wautelet, Reflections on Quasi-Loss of Nationality in
Comparative, International and European Perspective, 66 CEPS PAPER LIBERTY & SECURITY EUR.
(2014).
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are already covered by criminal law, deprivation appears to be redundant as a
policy tool. If somebody is executed, or sent to jail for thirty years, does it
make a difference whether he or she remains a citizen or not? Moreover, the
provision of security is the core function of the State and it has a duty to
prosecute and convict those who jeopardize it. By excommunicating them
without conviction, the British government is shirking this duty. Deprivation
is questionable even if conceived as a risk management tool because in a
globally interconnected world, removing a potential security threat from
Britain and the reach of its security services may trigger its return back home
with a vengeance.59 In any event, it is difficult to see how the deprivation of
citizenship of the accused person can fulfill the deterrent function of valid
punishment or meet requirements of due process; at best, it can be considered
neutral in this regard. It is more likely, however, to create new hurdles in the
trial of a person suddenly turned into a foreigner or rendered stateless.
On the other hand, public security may qualify the conditions for indi-
vidual choice of the citizens. No right is absolute, and in the Hamdi case the
U.S. Supreme Court found that grave threats to public security can justify
significant limitations of the right to due process of American citizens.60 It
would not be inconsistent for the Court to sustain abridgement of their right
to citizenship on the same grounds too.61 Still, this is a road not (yet) taken,
and the American government has not stepped beyond quasi-deprivation in
such cases.62 Both special relationship conceptions do not sustain such
qualifications in the case of birthright citizens, even an ‘accidental’ one like
Hamdi, as long as birthright remains supported by the law. However, an
ascriptive community view may allow deprivation through the back door for
those who appear as less than ‘real’ members of the community. Naturalized
and minority citizens are the obvious—and very vulnerable—targets of
deprivation on this account.
Shai Lavi’s understanding of citizenship as based on a duty of civic
allegiance is particularly interesting in the context of public security reasons
for deprivation. According to him, “[t]he civic duty of citizens is their
commitment to self-government. Citizenship can only be revoked as a
sanction for the violation of this duty.”63 Thus he claims that terrorists who
attack the foundations of self-government can be deprived of their citizen-
ship. Prima facie this understanding seems to respond to our normative
concerns quite well. The advantage of Lavi’s argument is that it both justifies
deprivation in some cases where citizens’ actions threaten the stability of the
59. Obviously, removing the person from the country also creates security risks for the other
countries, which counts as a separate reason against deprivation.
60. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
61. This is not to say that the authors agree with the majority opinion in the Hamdi case.
62. See Patrick Weil, Citizenship, Passports, and the Legal Identity of Americans: Edward
Snowden and Others Have a Case in the Courts, 123 YALE L.J. F. 565 (2014) (explaining the current
policy of withholding passports of undesirable citizens).
63. See Lavi, supra note 39.
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political community itself, while at the same time limiting governmental
discretion to a very narrow class of cases (which can be judicially reviewed).
Similar to the instrumental view, the disadvantage is that it ignores the effect
of deprivation of citizenship as a status in the international order, potentially
exposing other countries to the security threat that the excommunicated
citizen presents. This might be moot insofar as deprivation on this account
comes along with a criminal conviction so that the deprived will remain in
custody for a very long time. More importantly, Lavi’s approach does not
adequately account for the genuine link between a citizen and a political
community, which is at the heart of our understanding.
There are two final issues that need to be taken into account if deprivation
is to be administered on public security grounds or, in Lavi’s more limited
version, as a punishment for violent offences against self-government. The
first is conformity with the proportionality principle. Citizenship is a meta-
right, so its withdrawal places all rights in the balance.64 This not only
increases the justificatory burden on the authority that seeks withdrawal, but
makes the deprivation aleatory (i.e. it is difficult to predict how much the act
will affect each of the host of rights that depend on citizenship). This might
be possible if deprivation is administered by the criminal justice system that
has developed precisely to address such considerations. The courts will have
to establish the existing legal relationships of the person concerned with the
depriving State to estimate the magnitude of the consequences for her rights
in case of denationalization. However, if due account is taken of the
proportionality principle, deprivation would become especially inept as a risk
management measure: People who present a moderate to high risk to the public
but have strong connections and much to lose will find themselves better protected
than those who present lower risk but happen to be more weakly connected.
The second issue is the non bis in idem principle (no double jeopardy),
which universally governs the administration of all kinds of punishment for
all violations of law. In general, the fact that punishment for certain crimes
against public security consists of denationalization and a prison term does
not violate non bis in idem if such punishment is prescribed by criminal law
(just as the law may provide both a prison term and a prohibition to assume
public office for a single crime). However, in most States, deprivation is
administered by the executive with wide discretion, while the prison term is
awarded by a court of law following stricter standards. As a consequence the
two penalties will cumulate or alternate randomly, which means that they are
meted out according to different standards. This implies that they cannot
be conceived as a single punishment, so their accumulation will violate the
principle.
64. See Macklin, supra note 30.
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In sum, it seems difficult to justify citizenship deprivation on public
security grounds under any conception of citizenship apart from a State
discretion view. Deprivation seems much more appropriate on the other
grounds that we consider below, which may be surprising given that the
security grounds are the almost exclusive focus of the debate today in
academia and in the public sphere. It may appear paradoxical that we argue
against citizenship deprivation for sometimes outrageous crimes, but have
fewer objections against deprivation on the ground of certain misdemeanors.
Yet once we manage to step out of the retributive discourse, the paradox
disappears.
B. Non-compliance with Citizenship Duties
The second ground for deprivation is non-compliance with citizenship
duties. We consider here only generic duties that apply to all citizens and not
specific ones that are attributed only to certain categories, such as naturalized
citizens, ius soli citizens, or citizens with long-term residence abroad. These
cases are covered by other grounds for deprivation that we will discuss
below.
Strictly speaking, since obeying the laws is the most basic duty of citizens,
any violation of the law implies non-compliance with citizenship duties, yet
it does not follow that any such non-compliance is a sufficient reason for a
loss of status. If this were the case, it would imply an underlying perfection-
ism, which does not sit easily with liberalism and equality before the law, let
alone with a genuine link conception. That is why this ground for deprivation
can apply only to serious and quite particular failures (which are not already
covered by public security grounds). The underlying rationale for the
grounds for deprivation that we group under the heading of non-compliance
with citizenship duties is a duty of loyalty.
Typical examples are service in a foreign army or other service for a
foreign State, in cases where the host State is not a designated enemy and
therefore does not raise public security concerns. This ground is problematic
on any of the considered accounts, again with the possible exception of the
discretionary one. Service in a foreign army was a problem for the home
State in the past when every other State was a potential enemy. This ground
of deprivation is difficult to sustain today as a general provision when all
States, at least in theory, are committed to friendly relations and peaceful
cooperation.65 In such circumstances deprivation seems too arbitrary even
under the State discretion concept. Insofar as service for a foreign corpora-
tion providing ‘security services’ is not a ground for deprivation, service for a
foreign public authority should not be either.
65. U.N. Charter art. 1.
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A possible objection that one cannot swear allegiance to a second master
without betraying the first makes sense only on the assumption that the two
masters are hostile to each other, or at least are likely to issue conflicting
orders. As long as citizens are free to migrate to a different country, to find
work and to establish families there without breaking their obligations to the
home State, there is no reasonable ground to treat one particular occupation—
serving in the military—as a ground for deprivation.66 It is possible to justify,
however, a specific proscription of service in the armies of particular States,
on grounds of their particularly aggressive or totalitarian nature. North Korea
provides a case in point. This State is unlikely to constitute a security threat to
European States of the kind covered under the previous heading, yet the
loyalty of a citizen of a Western democracy who has voluntarily pledged
allegiance to a regime so alien to Western values may be reasonably
questioned. A discretionary deprivation regime may wish to make a point of
banishing such citizens. The individual choice conception obviously requires
the State to tolerate service for a foreign State, unless the State in question
does constitute a threat to the home country, but this will be a public security
rather than a non-compliance ground. Citizens by ascription should be out of
reach in such cases, however unpalatable their behavior appears. As long as
they do not attempt to violently overturn the institutions of self-governance
of their home country, it should not matter that they have participated in
another polity that rejects the values of the former.67 Similarly, on the
genuine link conception servicemen in a foreign army shall remain citizens,
unless the service has amounted to a loss of link, which, depending on the
circumstances of the case, may or may not be the case.
Employment in the public service of a foreign country is even less
justifiable on any of the four accounts. The only rationale for this ground
seems to be again the idea of exclusive duties of loyalty, i.e. that it is
impossible to serve two masters. Yet the idea that liberal States can probe
loyalty as a condition for citizenship independently of other reasons, such as
public security concerns, seems incompatible with basic tenets of liberalism
for which personal convictions are off limits for the State. As a general rule,
convictions start to matter only when they lead to certain behavior that is
justifiably disapproved by the State. Inasmuch as the service rendered to the
foreign country itself does not prejudice the interests of the home State, and
as long as the home State does not punish its citizens for their beliefs and
66. This objection and its refutation are parallel to the arguments against toleration of multiple
citizenship (which sometimes also entail a second oath of allegiance), which are difficult to sustain in
the contemporary world. See Martin P. Vink, Arjan H. Schakel, David Reichel, Gerard-Rene´ de Groot
& Ngo Chun Luk, The International Diffusion of Expatriate Dual Citizenship, (2014) (unpublished
paper presented at the 22nd International Conference of Europeanists in Paris, France on July 8-10
2015) (on file with the authors).
67. One could, however, imagine the case of a South Korean scientist who contributes to North
Korea’s nuclear armament program that is directed against South Korea, in which case citizenship
deprivation would be justified on all accounts.
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affections, the lack of loyalty that the service to the foreign country may
indicate cannot be a sufficient ground for deprivation.
Furthermore, while the State may have an interest in restricting foreign (or
even dual) citizens’ access to its high public offices, it is very difficult to
imagine what interests would be protected by prohibiting citizens from
taking up public service in the foreign country if the latter State does not
mind their foreign citizenship. A French citizen who has become director of
the central bank of Norway in no way prejudices the interests of France.
Finance is not considered hostile activity and even if the policies such a
person may pursue for the benefit of the host country may not be particularly
friendly to the home State it would still be difficult to justify such a grave
retaliation. Deprivation might be justifiable in the rare case where a citizen
takes up high public office in a country under international sanctions. Indeed,
if France is prohibiting its companies from trading with Iran, it should be able
to prohibit its citizens from taking public office in that country too. It is not
very likely that a country under international sanctions would be willing to
award high office to a citizen of a sanctioning country, but it is not impossible
if the person in question is a citizen of both and the appointing country does
not consider her other citizenship to be prejudicial to her loyalty.
Just for the sake of completeness we can consider whether the possible
rationale for this ground for deprivation is not perceived lack of loyalty but
prevention of a brain drain. Indeed, historically, most States have considered
their subjects a valuable resource, and this is a plausible hypothesis for the
emergence of this ground. But this reasoning fails to treat citizens as
autonomous agents and cannot be justified on the individual choice and
genuine link conceptions, while the very idea of depriving a birthright
member for utilitarian reasons is incompatible with the ascriptive view of
political community.
In the case of other duties that States impose on citizens, such as military
service or—in the case of the United States—paying taxes on income earned
abroad, it is in the interest of the State to preserve rather than sever the link
with the citizen who wants to shirk the duty. This explains why non-
compliance with citizenship duties is more often used as a reason for
restrictions on voluntary renunciation than as a reason for deprivation.
Whether these reasons can be accepted for the former purpose is beyond the
scope of our paper.
C. Flawed Acquisition and Loss of De Facto Citizenship
Flaws in the process of acquisition of citizenship generally constitute a
ground for deprivation only in the case of naturalization.68 It is a major
68. With the notable exception of the case of a birthright citizen whose parent loses citizenship
because of flawed prior acquisition, which will be discussed under derivative loss below.
76 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:47
ground for loss and its justification seems temptingly evident. Still, norma-
tive analysis needs to distinguish four possible causes of flawed acquisition
that create hurdles of unequal height to deprivation. Before turning to the
substantive grounds, we should briefly take note that there are two common
procedures by which flaws in acquisition may result in a loss of citizenship.
The first is denaturalization by virtue of a special act of the competent public
authority that has effect for the future and is no different from deprivation on
other grounds. The second is ex tunc nullification where, due to certain flaws
in the naturalization process, citizenship is deemed to have never been
acquired. De Groot & Wautelet note that the second is just a different
interpretation that only makes sense from the perspective of the State; from
the perspective of the individuals concerned, nullification is not different
from deprivation. The conclusion of their analysis in light of international
and European law is that such ‘quasi-loss’ should be treated as actual loss.69
We have already explained in Part II why nullification is generally problem-
atic as a procedure; in this Part we will pay special attention to each of the
substantive grounds of flawed acquisition that we propose to distinguish.
Note that, as explained in Part II, even flawed acquisition can lead to de facto
citizenship and deprivation needs then to balance the flawed attribution of
legal status against the lawful exercise of subsequent citizenship rights and
duties.
i. Error by Authorities
Errors by the administration are generally dealt with by administrative law,
and in most countries the latter is geared to protect the individual. In
particular, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations common
throughout Europe would serve to insulate the acquired citizenship from
subsequent discovery of flaws.70 There are obvious normative objections
against deprivation when the flaw is an error committed by the public
authorities involved in the process with no fault on the side of the citizen. Yet
the issue is a little more complicated. If substantive material conditions for
naturalization have not been fulfilled, it is in principle still justified to revoke
the naturalization, since otherwise the existence of the condition is put in
question. Further, sometimes the authorities themselves may, negligently or
even deliberately, commit errors and revert to legitimate protection if this is
discovered. For example, within the framework of a policy of mass natural-
ization of persons of Bulgarian origin resident in neighboring countries, the
administration was extremely lax about verifying origin, with many allega-
69. de Groot & Wautelet, supra note 58.
70. German and Austrian law specifically provide that in such cases the person is deemed to have
acquired citizenship under the procedure that was applied incorrectly by the authorities. However, in
the case of Austria, the time of fifteen years required for this effect is extremely long.
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tions of outright corruption.71 This example shows that the principles of
administrative law may not always be sufficient to adequately deal with
errors in the process of citizenship acquisition. We need to take into account
the same normative considerations as with the other grounds for deprivation.
First of all, we should be able to distinguish the importance of the
conditions that have not been fulfilled—inaccurate payment of the applica-
tion fee should not entail the same consequences as an insufficient number of
years of residence in the country or ineligibility for facilitated naturalization.
But even if the flaw is significant, there are many other circumstances that
ought to be taken into account. If the person has renounced her original
citizenship in view of her naturalization, the new citizenship can be revoked
only if she can reacquire her original one. Another relevant consideration is
the time since naturalization as well as the actual relationships the purported
citizen can demonstrate to have established with the country. Both of these
claims follow from the genuine link principle. Less straightforward are the
implications of the State treating the apparent citizen as possessing the legal
status—by issuing a passport, registering her for elections, or collecting
citizenship-specific payments. If the various State institutions have treated
the person as a citizen and imposed certain obligations on her in good faith,
this by itself need not preclude deprivation. However, to the extent that this
treatment did create links, such as entitlement to a public pension or holding
of a public office, these links should be taken into account. To allow for such
considerations, the procedure must be withdrawal; lapse can never be
justified in such cases. Denaturalization cannot be retroactive either because
some of the relationships created in the meantime might otherwise be legally
jeopardized. For example, if the putative citizen has purchased real estate in a
country where only citizens may legally own land and her citizenship is
revoked retroactively, the purchase itself might become void as violating
property law.
ii. Error by Individual
The case is similar when the error was committed by the individual rather
than the authorities, where the individuals or persons acting on their behalf
are unaware of facts that would lead to non-acquisition if they had been
known to the authorities. One example is a child who obtains citizenship iure
sanguinis from a man who thinks he is the father, if it turns out later that the
actual father is a foreign national. Another example is a person whose
naturalization is facilitated on grounds of her origin, which later turns out to
be mistaken. On the one hand, in order not to stimulate future applicants to
71. See Vesco Paskalev, Facilitated Naturalisation of Ethnic Bulgarians Seems Very Lucrative
Business, EUDO CITIZENSHIP OBSERVATORY, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/1286-
facilitated-naturalisation-of-ethnic-bulgarians-seems-very-lucrative-business (last visited Jan. 23,
2016) (recently there have been allegations of lack of control and investigations for corruption).
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act negligently, the public authority is likely to balance the relevant consider-
ations in a manner that is less favorable to them. On the other hand, the
legitimate expectations principle weighs in favor of persons who have
genuinely believed they have acquired citizenship.72 Obviously, this weight
increases over time and at a certain point should preclude revocation.
iii. Fraud Committed by the Individual
More interesting and certainly more controversial is the case when the
applicant has not merely erred but deliberately deceived the authorities in
order to acquire citizenship. The revocation of such naturalization seems to
follow from the principle that no one should benefit from his own illegal
behavior, but it also can be treated as a breach of loyalty by the citizen-to-
be.73 We agree that if the fraud is not trivial, then there is an obvious
justification for deprivation. Indeed, there is a good moral reason to deprive
the perpetrator from what was fraudulently obtained, although, as we shall
see below, several limitations apply even in this case. But we must consider
one possible objection first. In this case, as in the case of public security, this
ground for deprivation also constitutes a crime, which is punishable under
criminal law. This raises the question of whether criminal law alone is not the
more appropriate way to deal with such cases, which is pertinent given the
aleatory nature of the deprivation.74 Furthermore, the offence of the person in
question in this case is by far less dangerous for the political community than
in the case of a public security threat. In many instances the fraud would
consist in non-disclosure of another citizenship or in a conviction for a petty
crime in the home country; in an extreme example, a person who has
emigrated from an authoritarian country may have concealed from the
naturalization authorities of the host State that she has a conviction for her
stance against the regime, and her deeds may be entirely lawful under the law
of the host State. It is tempting to argue that the discovery of the fraud should
not constitute an independent ground for deprivation at all, but only a reason
to reopen and reconsider the naturalization case on its merits.
However, somewhat paradoxically, the higher protection that the criminal
system provides to the person concerned is a reason not to leave the case to it
alone. Precisely because the fraud in such cases may often be too small an
offence to trigger full-scale prosecution, it may be better to deal with the
matter within the realm of citizenship law. Otherwise, workload, statutes of
limitation, or prevention policy considerations may allow the fraudsters to
get away with the citizenship that they got, and encourage others to give it a
72. See de Groot & Wautelet, supra note 58.
73. In Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-01449, both the European Court of
Justice, and the Advocate General mentioned only the second rationale, which in our view is
somewhat weaker than the first one.
74. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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try too. Criminal law is a system with its own dynamics, and even though it
may be intentionally employed to preserve the conditions for naturalization,
for these reasons it may often fail to do so. On the other hand, adequate
administrative process allows for a fraudulent deed to be reliably ascertained,
with sufficient guarantees that the rights of the alleged perpetrator are
observed and the relevant circumstances are taken into account.75 Merely
reopening the case upon discovery of fraud will not do: If there are no
untoward consequences for the perpetrators, they will be always tempted to
try. In order to deter the applicants for naturalization from cheating in cases
where criminal law cannot be fully relied upon, citizenship law must provide
for its own sanctions. It can go even further than revocation, if a greater need
for prevention requires this, and persons who have committed serious fraud
that is immediately discovered may not only lose their new citizenship but
also be barred from naturalization for a certain period. Note that this ground
is justifiable according to each of the four conceptions of citizenship. Its
rationale is instrumental, but its aim is to ensure the integrity of citizenship
itself and of the procedures under which it is awarded rather than the success
of other governmental policies. That is why the earlier criticism against
instrumental uses of deprivation does not apply to this case. Still, constraints
on the power of deprivation are also pertinent to this ground and to these we
turn now.
The ultimate decision for revocation of naturalization on the ground of
fraud should depend on weighing the following considerations:76
(1) Severity of the fraud: Even though we have argued that deprivation in
case of fraud is an independent sanction belonging to citizenship law, there is
no reason why the general principles developed in criminal law should not
apply as well. Thus, the sanction should be commensurate with the severity
of the threat to the legal order that the fraud presents. Not reporting on past
receipt of welfare where this is ground for exclusion from naturalization
should be treated differently from bribing the civil servants who are respon-
sible for the decision. Although revocation is a binary matter, in the balancing
procedure different degrees of severity can be matched against degrees of
attachment to the country. In the same vein, the decision should consider the
general preventive effect: In cases where bribery of the officials is rampant,
the authorities may wish to weigh such fraud more heavily than in cases
where the perpetrator has forged certain documents, or vice versa.
(2) Length of time over which the person has held citizenship and was
treated as a de facto citizen by the authorities: This consideration may be
controversial because eventually it would make fraudulent naturalization a
75. Note, however, that in many European States no such guarantees are provided and in
Bulgaria, for example, the persons concerned would not even be formally notified of the deprivation
procedures against them.
76. Note that the first two of these constraints were made explicit in the Rottmann judgment para.
56, so for the EU States they are also a matter of law. We shall revisit this case infra in Part V.
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fait accompli, yet its justification is similar to that of the statutes of limitation
that universally apply to all crimes (save crimes against humanity), including
fraud. If the sanction is deprivation of citizenship, the power of the State to
withdraw a status not rightfully acquired is initially indisputable but becomes
weaker over time if the person acquires in the meantime independent grounds
for retaining citizenship status.77
(3) Genuine links developed by the person as a result of having enjoyed
citizenship: The rationale for this constraint is very similar to the previous
one (as well as the objections against it). It requires due consideration of
circumstances other than the time period. These can include continuity of
residence, establishment of personal relationships, acquisition of property,
political participation, holding public office, etc. Taking all of these into
account, the deprivation authority must consider whether the person would
qualify for acquisition of citizenship now. Note that on a genuine link account
the acquisition of citizenship and the establishment of relationships with the
polity mutually presuppose each other and this remains so even if the
acquisition is fraudulent. Circularity should therefore not constitute a prob-
lem: If the naturalization allowed someone to acquire some rights reserved
for citizens, e.g. election to public office, the subsequent discovery of a fraud
should not nullify both. On the contrary, the acquired public office would be a
genuine link to be considered against deprivation. (We set aside the possibil-
ity that the naturalization fraud amounts also to electoral fraud, or that the
person is jailed for the former and on this ground her term of office is
terminated.)
(4) Harmful effects of deprivation: Finally, the decision to revoke a
fraudulent acquisition should account for the future consequences for the
persons concerned. Although international law does not prohibit deprivation
in case of fraudulent acquisition if the person would become stateless,78 the
authority should also consider whether the persons concerned are liable to be
deported to a State where they face persecution. In the latter case, they may
wish to limit the consequences to a loss of citizenship status while granting
the person a long-term residence permit as a foreign national that protects her
other interests. More generally, deprivation should not automatically result in
a status that foresees or permits deportation. Instead, the consequences of
deportation need to be considered independently of those justifying
withdrawal.
Denmark provides a good example of such a proportionality test. The
Danish courts recently decided nine cases of fraudulent acquisition, ordering
deprivation in four of them. In the other five, the judgments were favorable to
the persons, on the basis of a proportionality test weighing seriousness of the
77. This is most obvious for fraudulently acquired citizenship transferred to innocent family
members.
78. See European Convention on Nationality, Art. 7(3), Nov. 6, 1997, 37 ILM 44.
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fraud against the consequences of deprivation. Three considerations were
pivotal: the length of residence in Denmark, the family and work conditions,
and the context of the fraud.79
In most cases, these considerations can be taken into account only in a
withdrawal procedure. But automatic lapse may be justifiable where the
fraud is severe, where the time elapsed is short and where there are no
genuine links and no harmful effects, i.e. where no de facto citizenship has
emerged. Retroactivity, however, requires a justification of its own, so the
presumption for withdrawal remains strong.
iv. Abuse by Authorities
The sovereignty of States in matters of nationality is legally constrained by
their own constitutions, international law and by EU law for EU Member
States, as well as by general duties of mutual respect and consideration.
When a government ignores these constraints in awarding citizenships, it is
abusing its power. This raises the question of whether the courts or successor
governments should have the power to reverse such decisions by nullifying
the award. A recent example of such abuse was the investor citizenship
scheme introduced in 2014 by Malta, whereby Maltese nationality would be
awarded to anyone willing to pay a contribution to a State fund of €650,000,
without ever setting foot in the country.80 Another example is provided by the
ethno-culturally over-inclusive citizenship policies of the Orba´n government
in Hungary that we mentioned in Part I.
While there seem to be good reasons for the authorities to reverse the
effect of such policies, the revocation of acquired rights is always problem-
atic. Notwithstanding the justification of the general policy, with regard to
each person concerned remedial deprivation is still deprivation: The usual
burden of justification applies and nullification should not be possible. Would
it still be permissible for subsequent legislation to introduce new conditions
for the retaining of citizenships that have been abusively awarded as an
exercise in damage control? There are three principles that may guide the
design of a remedy: genuine links, complicity of the persons affected and the
harmful consequences for these persons. Thus, it might be easier to revoke
the naturalization of investors who were merely interested in another pass-
port than the citizenship of ethnic Hungarians who do consider themselves as
belonging to Hungary. In the same vein, it will be more difficult to justify the
revocation of the Maltese citizenship of an investor who did settle in Malta.
On the other hand, an investor who already carries several passports would
not be harmed much if she loses Maltese citizenship and a Hungarian living
for generations in Slovakia will not suffer from the loss of her recently
79. We are indebted to Eva Ersbøll for this example.
80. A further condition of investment of € 500,000 and a pro forma residency condition were later
added. See details in CARRERA, supra note 8; Baubo¨ck & Shachar, supra note 8.
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acquired Hungarian passport as much as from being deprived of Slovakian
citizenship.81 By contrast, an ethnic Hungarian from Serbia would addition-
ally suffer loss of EU citizenship since Serbia is not an EU Member State.
The problem is that for any remedy to be non-arbitrary, it must be applied
to individuals on a case-by-case basis, while the mass scale of the abuse in
the Hungarian case requires a solution for a whole class of citizens. Yet, if
goodwill is available, the remedial law may be tailored with opt-ins and
opt-outs to accommodate individual situations. One example could be the
introduction of a genuine link condition for retaining citizenship that would
lead to lapse if these citizens fail to take up residence. Such corrective
legislation would certainly discriminate between the various groups of
citizens abroad with regard to the circumstances of the acquisition of their
citizenship status, but different treatment of cases that are sufficiently
dissimilar can be justified. The least problematic response, which unfortu-
nately has no short-term effect, is to adopt a general limitation of intergenera-
tional transmission among groups without genuine link.
In this Part we have considered the various possible flaws in naturalization
only. However, it is not impossible for birthright acquisition to be flawed too.
For example, when parents have committed fraud in their naturalization and
their citizenship is nullified retroactively, and this has consequences for the
citizenship of their child. We will discuss such cases in the following
subsection. But it is worth noting here that while naturalization is potentially
reversible upon discovery of certain flaws, as discussed above, flawed
birthright acquisition must be considered with regard to the best interest of
the child, which makes it generally irreversible. Thus, the principle of the
best interest of the child creates an interesting exception to the general
prohibition of discrimination between citizens by birth and by naturaliza-
tion,82 protecting the status of the former, while that of the latter is sometimes
revocable on the grounds discussed above.
D. Derivative Loss
Derivative loss can be interpreted in two ways. First, a person may lose
citizenship status as a consequence of being deprived of another citizenship.
This is a purely hypothetical possibility when the two citizenships involved
are those of independent States. However, it becomes a live issue and
problem in the context of the EU. Derivative loss of EU citizenship occurs if
a person is deprived of Member State nationality and is not also a national of
another Member State.
81. In response to the Hungarian policy, Slovakia prohibited voluntary acquisition of another
citizenship, on pain of deprivation. See Baubo¨ck, supra note 10.
82. See Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Feb. 20, 1957, 360 U.N.T.S. 117;
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.C. 14, Art. 9, European Convention on Nationality, Nov. 11, 1997 166 E.C.T. Art. 5 (2).
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Second, derivative loss occurs if a person has acquired citizenship deriva-
tively because of her relations with another person and that person loses her
citizenship. In this case, there is only one polity involved, but the derivation
occurs through original transfer or extension of citizenship from an anchor
person to another one. This mode of loss applies practically only to close
family members, i.e. spouses and natural or adopted children.
Nowadays, the understanding that all members of the family need to have
the same nationality and therefore the citizenship of wives and children must
follow that of the male head of the family has been abandoned in Western
States.83 There is a general tendency to strengthen the independence of each
individual family member so that they will not be automatically affected by a
change of status of the others. The normative reasons for this are too obvious
to need elaboration. Yet there are still two instances when change of family
status or change of citizenship of a family member may be relevant for the
continued citizenship of the others. The first is when the change of citizen-
ship of the anchor person is the result of a loss of genuine link, and this may
then be the case for the other family member too. Still, the link of each family
member ought to be considered individually. The second instance is when the
acquisition of citizenship of one family member is related to the citizenship
of another. We shall discuss in turn how these arguments apply to children,
spouses and adoptive children.
Involuntary derivative loss may be a consequence both of deprivation of
the anchor person or of voluntary renunciation by that person. For example,
if a parent renounces citizenship, then a minor child may lose it derivatively
without her consent. The normative principles applying to the dependent
citizenship holder are the same in case of voluntary and involuntary loss by
the anchor person, so we will not discuss such cases separately.
i. Children
In States without general ius soli, the nationality of children historically
automatically followed that of their parents, especially that of their father.
Today, the dominant normative principle in dealing with children is the best
interest of the child.84
A literal reading of ‘best interest’ would prohibit any derivative loss for
children, since having an additional citizenship that has been lost by her
parents will generally not be a disadvantage for a minor child who is not yet
subjected to citizenship duties such as military service. Even if the child has
another citizenship and statelessness is not an issue, he or she would hardly
be disadvantaged from having one citizenship too many and might gain
83. See de Groot, supra note 1.
84. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 3 (1). “In all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” Id.
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additional mobility and residence rights, which is clearly in his or her
interest.85 In both the case of the parent losing citizenship and of the child
losing the relationship with the parent, the child should therefore not lose the
citizenship acquired from that parent.
Such a strong interpretation of ‘best interest’ is most easily defended from
an individual choice perspective and is likely to collide with the State
discretion view. Against this, State authorities in the EU might argue that
protecting children from derivative loss in ius sanguinis countries might
provide incentives for parents to commit fraud in naturalization in order to
gain secure citizenship for their children and be thus protected in their
residence rights as primary caregivers of the child.86 Although this seems
rather far-fetched, such arguments are common in the Eurosceptic tabloids
and the discretionary understanding may thus support a weaker interpretation
of the child’s best interests.
A third alternative would provide a robust but still limited interpretation of
‘best interest.’ Instead of maximizing the interest of the children, the best
interest condition may be satisfied if children are assured a sufficiently stable
status. This would entail that derivative citizenship could not be withdrawn
after a certain time of residence of the child in the country and that below this
threshold the authorities must assure that the child has another citizenship,
will not be separated from the parent, and will not be deported to a country
where she would not be provided with reasonable levels of security, health
care, education, etc. If the conditions in the latter State are acceptable,
deprivation and alignment with the nationality of the parent may be in the
best interest of a child who has not been a long-term resident. A clear set of
such criteria that would limit administrative discretion may be preferable to
an open-ended interpretation of the ‘best interest’ principle.87
Such an argument would be difficult to accept under the State discretion
and individual choice views, but could be sustained by the two special
relationship conceptions, which are mindful of the ties between a person and
a State.
85. The only conceivable disadvantage is if at a latter point in life she is suspected of terrorism. In
such cases the availability of a second citizenship may expose her to deprivation, while potential
statelessness may protect her from losing her preferred citizenship. However, the probability that the
same person is exposed to potential derivative loss as a child and threatened with deprivation on
security grounds as an adult seems extremely low.
86. The right of residence of primary care-giving parents of EU citizen children has been
established through the CJEU judgments in Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen v. Sec’y of State for the
Home Dep’t, 2004 E.C.R. I-9951; see also Case C-34/09, Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi,
2011 E.C.R. I-1232.
87. According to Audrey Macklin, the ‘best interest of the child’ has been invoked as a reason for
deportation in Canadian immigration contexts, whereas Australia uses a presumption of genuine link
on the basis of the years the child has been resident in the country. Interview with Audrey Macklin
(Jan. 3, 2015).
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ii. Spouses
When derivative loss of citizenship by spouses is questioned, the leading
consideration is not their best interests, but their autonomy, both for norma-
tive reasons and as a matter of international law. Again, neither the dissolu-
tion of the marriage per se nor the loss of citizenship by one spouse need to
automatically entail loss for the other, yet the status of the latter may be
reconsidered if the circumstances of the acquisition were related in the first
place. Such is the case with facilitated naturalization. If the spouse has
benefited from a shorter residence requirement by virtue of being married to
a citizen, there is a potential reason to revoke her citizenship if the citizenship
of the former has been revoked. The justification of the derivative loss will
vary according to the grounds for loss of the anchor person. If the latter is
denaturalized on public security grounds, there is no reason for this to affect
any innocent member of her family. By contrast, if the acquisition was
flawed, and the person is considered to have never been a citizen, her spouse
could not have acquired that status either. If the reason is a loss of genuine
link of the anchor person, this can at most, prompt reconsideration of the
status of the family members in order to assess if their own link has changed.
In any event, in case of derivative loss the relevant circumstances to be
reconsidered include those related to the deprivation—i.e. complicity, good
faith, etc.—and circumstances that are specific for the dependent spouse—
i.e. genuine link, legitimate expectations, availability of other citizenship,
etc. For example, if a person has benefited from a shorter residence require-
ment for spouses of citizens, the additional time of residence as a naturalized
citizen must be taken into account when considering whether the dependent
spouse should also lose citizenship in case the anchor person is being
deprived. Persons who are deprived of citizenship in such circumstances
must at least be given a fresh opportunity for application, counting all the
years of residence. None of the four conceptions of deprivation could justify
sending them back to the starting line.
Divorce is a particularly interesting ground for deprivation, as in some
circumstances the general independence rule may have to be relaxed to
prevent citizenship acquisitions via a marriage of convenience. It is difficult,
and also inappropriate for a liberal State to investigate what the real motives
for the marriage were, but a prompt divorce immediately after naturalization
is certainly suspect. The obvious solution is to prescribe a certain minimal
‘holding period’ after marriage within which revocation of naturalization
remains possible. Yet, because it is not rare for a genuine marriage to quickly
fall apart, any naturalization regime must be restrained when considering
revocation on such grounds. Furthermore, there is a serious danger that
vulnerable spouses will choose to sustain a failing marriage, and even suffer
domestic violence, for fear that they may lose their citizenship if they
divorce. To avoid creating such perverse incentives, citizenship law, what-
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ever its underlying conception, must try to protect the status of the person
concerned, even if this would result in over-inclusion. One way to balance
the need to deter marriages of convenience on the one hand and the
protection of vulnerable spouses on the other is to revoke, in the case of a
prompt divorce, any naturalizations that were facilitated by the marriage, but
to guarantee a residence permit to the divorcee.
iii. Adoption
The case of adoption is interesting in that the automatic change of
nationality upon a change of family status, a common rule for marrying
women in times past, can be justified. In case of full adoption of children with
a different nationality they may justifiably lose their original citizenship
automatically. The reason is that the need to create links with the adoptive
parents, as if they were natural ones, is more important than the possible
gains from an extra citizenship. In other words, in the case of adoption, the
best interest of the child need not trump concerns for unity of citizenship
within the family. In cases of ‘open adoptions’ or ‘partial adoptions,’ when
the link between the adopted children and the biological parents is preserved,
the opposite logic will apply and the original citizenship should not be lost.
Even in full adoption, when the child does not acquire the citizenship of the
adoptive parent automatically but after some period of residence, the original
citizenship should not be lost, at least until the new citizenship is actually
acquired. In most other respects, such case is analogous to those of natural
children whose parent is losing citizenship. Cases in which the adoption itself
is revoked are analogous to divorce.
E. Loss of Genuine Link
Genuine link is our preferred normative principle for determining citizen-
ship status and should also guide decisions in a case of deprivation. So far, we
have considered genuine link as a constraint on other grounds for depriva-
tion. But the loss of link may itself constitute a ground for deprivation in the
absence of other grounds. It is worth bearing in mind that according to our
understanding of citizenship, States must avoid not only under-inclusion, but
also over-inclusion. While a State discretion view holds that governments
should have deprivation powers on this ground which they may use, the
genuine link conception requires that they do so in order to prevent the
inclusion of persons without sufficiently strong claims for citizenship.
As explained in Part III, this power should still be narrowly construed so
that permanent residence abroad is not regarded as entailing a loss of genuine
links. Historically, residence abroad was among the most common grounds
for deprivation. It still exists as a reason for lapse or withdrawal in a
significant number of European States, but never as a sufficient one. It is
always qualified by the prevention of statelessness, so that the person must
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first have access to another nationality. Among the countries compared on
EUDO Citizenship, the Netherlands stands out as the one where the only
additional condition is third-country nationality. Dutch citizenship is lost
after a lapse of ten years of uninterrupted residence in a non-EU State if the
person does not become stateless or work in the Dutch diplomatic service or
an international organization.
In other States, additional conditions aim either at exempting first-
generation emigrants and their minor children88 or, to the contrary, targeting
first-generation emigrants returning to their countries of origin by depriving
only naturalized citizens in the case of residence abroad.
These contrasting attitudes clearly illustrate the difference between the
genuine link and ascriptive community conceptions. The latter is primarily
concerned with ensuring that naturalized persons fit into a predefined
birthright community and is less concerned about subsequent generations
who acquire an ancestral citizenship by birth abroad. While birthright
citizens obtain their status unconditionally, and for life, the citizenship of
naturalized persons is made conditional upon permanent residence. It is
interesting that such discrimination of naturalized citizens applies primarily
in common law countries (Cyprus, Ireland and Malta), as well as in many
Latin American states with unconditional ius soli citizenship. Most recently,
the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act of 2014 introduced a commit-
ment to reside permanently in Canada as a condition for naturalization.89 A
genuine link view may share a concern about purely instrumental naturaliza-
tions for the sake of obtaining a passport that permits the new citizen to settle
in a third country. Yet this concern cannot justify discrimination between
naturalized and birthright citizens. The problem of instrumental abuses of
naturalization should therefore be addressed by applying genuine link condi-
tions retrospectively, but never prospectively. The years of residence required
for naturalization define a threshold for a presumptive genuine link. Just as
birthright citizens, those who have passed the threshold should be able to
keep their new citizenship for life and take it abroad without any further
conditions.
The same view justifies the second set of conditions that aim at stopping
the proliferation of extraterritorial ius sanguinis. First-generation emigrants
should be exempted from deprivation due to residence abroad, because there
is a reasonable presumption that many, or most of them, retain genuine links
to their country of origin. Even the transatlantic migration of around 1900
included close to one third return migration,90 and today’s travel and
communication technologies allow migrants to maintain intense relation-
88. Deprivation applies only to persons born abroad who have never resided in their parents’
country of citizenship and only after the age of majority.
89. See Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, S.C 2014 (Can.).
90. DREW KEELING, THE BUSINESS OF TRANSATLANTIC MIGRATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES, 1900-1914, 201 (Chronos 2012).
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ships with home countries. This is adequately accounted for by the concep-
tion of citizenship as a stable lifelong relationship between the individual and
the State. Thus, unless the persons themselves decide to sever the link
through renunciation, the link generally survives the loss of residence. This
may or may not be true for subsequent generations born abroad. While in
some cases they preserve a link to their parents’ homeland(s), in others, they
may be completely disconnected and identify exclusively with the host
country. That is why instead of blanket deprivation of foreign-born citizens
after the age of majority, withdrawal procedures that allow for some form of
self-selection are preferable. Yet, in order to prevent over-inclusion, the
States of origin should introduce some limits to intergenerational transmis-
sion of citizenship, as discussed in Part III.
Other limitations may also be necessary. Since citizenship of the wealthy
Western countries is associated with freedom to travel, it is tempting for
many people from the rest of the world to dig deeply into their family history
to find evidence of their European origins. Guido Tintori has estimated that
about one million persons residing abroad have received Italian passports
between 1998 and 2010, 73% of which were issued in Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay.91 This is a clear case of over-inclusion since it offends equality,
with regard to both the other South Americans, who are not so lucky to have
Italian ancestry, and the Italian polity, by attributing equal status and rights to
persons who have no stake in the political community. Both reasons support
phasing out ius sanguinis acquisition across generations born abroad. If third
generations no longer acquire citizenship iure sanguinis at birth, this avoids
exposing them later on to a risk of being deprived of a citizenship that they
may already have made use of. Where this solution is unavailable because
perpetual ius sanguinis is constitutionally entrenched, introducing lapse
procedures for third and later generations born abroad seems justified if
neither they, nor their grandparents or parents have resumed residence in the
country of origin for a sufficient period of time.
Next to residence abroad, the second common proxy for loss of genuine
link is the acquisition of another citizenship. Historically, opting for a new
citizenship created a strong presumption for loss of link and could lead to
automatic loss. Nowadays, despite the increasing worldwide toleration of
multiple nationality, fourteen out of forty-two European States in the EUDO
Citizenship databases still deprive citizens for this reason, although often
91. See Guido Tintori, More than one million individuals got Italian citizenship abroad in twelve
years (1998-2010), EUDO CITIZENSHIP NEWS (Nov. 21, 2012), http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/
citizenship-news/748-more-than-one-million-individuals-got-italian-citizenship-abroad-in-the-
twelve-years-1998-2010%3E. The case may appear similar to the Hungarians living for generations
in the neighbouring countries, but unlike most of the Argentinean Italians, most Hungarians do
identify as Hungarians, even though arguably they do not have a genuine link with the contemporary
Hungarian State. Both cases, however, show the problem of over-inclusion and the need to phase out
intergenerational transmission of citizenship.
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with significant qualifications.92 This ground for deprivation can be easily
supported by the discretionary understanding of citizenship. It is unsustain-
able on the individual choice conception if we exclude the outdated U.S.
doctrine of expatriation discussed in Part II. With so many countries allowing
multiple citizenships today, it is difficult for anyone to believe that acquisi-
tion of another citizenship necessarily implies renunciation. The ascriptive
conception provides strong arguments against deprivation on this ground for
birthright citizens, but allows for asymmetrical treatment of incoming and
outgoing naturalizations by using renunciation of a foreign citizenship as a
test of assimilation into the birthright community. As discussed earlier, under
the genuine link conception the establishment of a link to another country
does not necessarily break the relationship with the original one. Even when
a citizen acquires a foreign nationality without a genuine link to that country,
there is not sufficient proof that the person no longer has a genuine link to her
country of origin. The duty to prevent over-inclusion lies, in this case, with
the foreign State. The Slovakian law of 2010, which strips those who
voluntarily acquire a foreign nationality of their Slovak citizenship, provides
a negative illustration.93 Although there are reasonable doubts whether
Hungarian language minorities who do not take up residence in Hungary
should be awarded Hungarian citizenship, their act of accepting the Hungar-
ian offer cannot possibly be interpreted as proof that they no longer have a
genuine link to their country of birth and permanent residence.
V. EU CITIZENSHIP AS A CONSTRAINT ON DEPRIVATION
In this Part we consider whether EU citizenship, as established by the
Maastricht Treaty and interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU), adds anything to the constraints on State powers in citizen-
ship deprivation that emerge from the individual choice, ascriptive
membership and genuine link conceptions and that apply to liberal States
independently of their membership in a supranational union.
We focus on such constraints because EU citizenship status is a derivative
of the nationality of Member States.94 Thus, the EU itself has no citizenship
deprivation powers and the four conceptions can be applied to EU citizenship
only indirectly. A State discretion view that maximizes legislative freedom
for Member States thereby minimizes the scope of EU law in matters of
citizenship determination. An ascriptive conception will have the same
92. See the results for L05 ‘Acquisition of foreign citizenship’ in Comparing Citizenship, supra
note 24, http://www.eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-loss?p&applicationmodes
Loss&search1&modebyidmode&idmodeL05 (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
93. Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic as last amended by Act no.
250/2010 Coll.
94. According to Art. 20 “Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a
citizen of the Union,” Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), O.J. C 326/47
(2012).
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effect. Since EU citizenship is not based on descent from EU citizens, or birth
in the EU territory, there is no ascriptive community of EU citizens, let alone
a nation-building project at EU level that sustains such a vision. Maintaining
the integrity of the Member States’ ascriptive communities requires keeping
EU competencies in matters of acquisition and loss of citizenship as weak as
possible. By contrast, an individual choice perspective will promote an
individual’s choice of EU citizenship relatively independently of their
interest in the nationality of a Member State. Since the two statuses are
derivatively linked to each other, the practical implication is that Member
States should open access to their nationality to those who are mainly
interested in EU citizenship and its free movement rights rather than in
residence and membership in the State granting them citizenship.95 A
genuine link conception differs from all three alternative approaches. Instead
of conceiving individual ties to Member States and the EU as conflicting
affiliations, the genuine link conception considers them as complementary
and mutually reinforcing.
Below we will consider five ways in which the common status of EU
citizenship may constrain Member States’ laws and policies on citizenship
deprivation.
(1) Fundamental rights protection: The EU has committed itself in various
ways to fundamental rights that constrain deprivation policies of its Member
States, especially through non-discrimination requirements and procedural
safeguards.
(2) Exercise of free movement rights: The core right of EU citizenship is
freedom of movement within the Union;96 therefore, EU citizenship must not
be lost due to long-term residence in other Member States.
(3) Dual citizenship toleration in a political union: Non-toleration of dual
citizenship is based on assumptions about citizenship duties of exclusive
loyalty or potential enmity between States, which cannot be upheld between
the Member States of a politically integrated union.
(4) Unequal risks of loss: Member States’ diverging provisions on renun-
ciation and deprivation create different opportunities and risks of citizenship
loss which make EU citizenship itself unequal as a status.
(5) Genuine link to the EU: Since EU citizenship is a fundamental status of
Member State nationals, a Member State should not be able to deprive its
nationals of this status as long as they have a genuine link to the EU, even if
they have lost their genuine links to the Member State.
95. Dimitry Kochenov has consistently defended this view. See Dimitry Kochenov, EU Citizen-
ship without Duties, 20 EUROPEAN L.J. 482 (2014).
96. See Art. 20 TFEU.
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A. Fundamental Rights Protection
The protection of fundamental rights and the rule of law are conditions for
membership in the EU and serve as general principles of EU law that may
create additional constraints for the deprivation policies of its Member
States. The norms on non-discrimination and the requirements for procedural
safeguards are especially pertinent. In its judgment in Janko Rottmann v.
Freistaat Bayern,97 the CJEU made it explicit that these constraints apply
also to derivative loss of EU citizenship. In his opinion, Advocate General
Maduro raised arguments that were not repeated explicitly in the subsequent
decision of the Court, but remain important for the normative discussion.98
Most importantly, in justifying the applicability of EU law in citizenship
matters, an area considered to be at the heart of national sovereignty, Maduro
claimed that the powers of the Member States cannot be discretionary.99 On
the basis of the earlier judgment in Micheletti v. Delegacio´n del Gobierno en
Cantabria, Member States were required to specify the conditions for
acquisition and loss of nationality with “due regard to Community law.”100
This is a (limited) challenge to the discretionary conception itself. Discretion,
as we defined it here, implies a broad scope for legislative choices to be made
in matters of citizenship. However, when the loss of European citizenship is
at stake, some choices that are acceptable under national constitutions may
not be available under EU law. For example, facilitated naturalization for
categories of third-country nationals who intend to use their EU citizenship
right of free movement within the EU in order to take residence in another
Member State could violate the principle of sincere cooperation required by
Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)101 and thus fail to show
due regard to Community law.102 While the Advocate General only asserted
that certain legislative choices are not permitted to Member States, the Court
seemed to go a bit further, asserting that all Member State decisions that
entail an involuntary loss of EU citizenship shall be guided by the principle
of proportionality enshrined in Article 5(4) TEU.
Interestingly, in acknowledging the powers of the States to withdraw
citizenship in the case of fraud, the Court notes that this is necessary “to
protect the special relationship of solidarity and good faith between [a State]
and its nationals.”103 As discussed in Part III, a ‘special relationship’
conception of citizenship suggests some reciprocity of duties that are difficult
to square with unilateral choices of the States or the individuals concerned.
97. Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-1467.
98. Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-1467 (Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro).
99. Id.
100. Case C-369/90, Micheletti v. Delegacio´n del Gobierno en Cantabria, 1992 E.C.R. 1-4239.
101. Treaty on European Union, O.J. C 326/01 (2012).
102. Another example is, of course, the Maltese investor citizenship scheme to which we return
below.
103. Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-1467.
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On the other hand, when specifying the circumstances that the national
authorities must take into account when deciding on deprivation, the Court
seemed to be concerned only about the basic rule of law and the protection of
rights, rather than the existence of a genuine link. Of the four criteria listed in
paragraph fifty-six of the judgment—consequences for the person and her
family members, lapse of time, gravity of the offence, and possibility of
recovery of the original nationality—only the first two refer to genuine links,
while the gravity of the offence has clearly a retributive basis and the
recovery of original citizenship considers the severity of consequences in
case of deprivation. It is worth noting that taking recovery options into
account would lead to a different treatment of similar cases depending on
the rules of the State of origin. This can be especially problematic if the
Rottmann test is to be applied to other grounds for deprivation. In sum, the
limits set by the Court on the powers of EU Member States to denaturalize
their citizens are modest, and European citizens are clearly less than
‘sovereign’ in the sense that Patrick Weil reads in the jurisprudence of the
United States Supreme Court.104 This is hardly surprising given the deriva-
tive nature of the EU citizenship.
The Court of Justice implicitly set out a constraint on the deprivation
procedure too.105 If the exercise of deprivation powers by the Member States
is amenable to judicial review, carried out in light of EU law,106 it follows
that an active decision of a public authority is required and that the decision
must be subject to judicial review.107 As obvious as this is, there is no
possibility of judicial review in several Member States: Had Janko Rottmann
taken residence in Bulgaria instead of Germany, he would not have had any
chance of a court hearing and his case could not possibly have reached the
CJEU. De Groot & Wautelet note that, although the Court only made an
explicit requirement that Member States should comply with the principle of
proportionality, they must also comply with the principle of legitimate
expectations and equality, as mentioned by Advocate General Maduro
(paragraphs 34 and 31 respectively), and the principle of access to courts.108
The latter is a necessary precondition for the application of all the other
principles that were explicitly mentioned.
The Rottmann judgment and Maduro’s opinion do not reject the State
discretion view, but invoke a number of general principles that significantly
constrain it. The principles of proportionality, legitimate expectations, non-
discrimination and judicial review provide strong safeguards against illiberal
104. WEIL, supra note 4.
105. Rottmann, 2010 E.C.R. I-1467.
106. Micheletti, 1992 E.C.R. 1-4240, at para. 48.
107. There are due process requirements in matters of nationality in the European Convention on
Nationality (Arts 11 and 12) and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (Art. 8(4)),
but the Rottmann ruling implies that these must be exercised by courts and cannot be limited to
procedural matters only.
108. de Groot & Wautelet, supra note 58.
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choices of the Member States.109 Judicial review is particularly important
with regard to public security grounds for deprivation, which are often
subject to no, or only very limited, due process. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the Court of Justice is willing to challenge a decision to
deprive a person of British citizenship on the grounds that such deprivation is
conducive to the public good. The British law of 2002, as amended in 2006
and 2014,110 does not take into account that the British citizens, who are
deprived of their citizenship on grounds of public security, will in nearly all
cases also lose their EU citizenship. The CJEU has repeatedly argued that EU
citizenship is a fundamental status and that the EU law protection of this
status is not entirely dependent on cross-border situations inside the EU.111 If
the British government deprives citizens who are abroad in a third country of
their EU citizenship, they lose not only the right to return to Britain, but also
the right to avail themselves of diplomatic protection by other Member
States.
It is interesting to note that Rottmann leaves open a lacuna in international
law. If the procedural requirements are satisfied and a person has voluntarily
renounced his former citizenship, a new citizenship acquired by fraud can be
withdrawn, even if the person becomes stateless and the country of former
citizenship is under no legal obligation to take him back. However, the EU, as
a common area of justice, freedom and security, is different from the
international State system and therefore ought to provide an environment
where statelessness is avoided, even in such a case. As a developed system
for cooperation among Member States, the EU can be expected to allocate
the duty to provide the person with a nationality to either the State of
residence or origin. In this case, as Maduro hinted, it is plausible to conclude
that Austria has a duty to restore the citizenship of Janko Rottmann.112 Even
though the Advocate General stopped short of asserting such powers for the
Union, and the Court shied away from the question, they could have argued
that the Member States have a duty, under Article 4(3), to sincerely cooperate
in order to avoid creating statelessness and jointly assure the effectiveness of
the right to nationality.113
B. Exercise of Free Movement Rights
The core right of EU citizenship (and historically a raison d’eˆtre of the
Union itself) is freedom of movement within the Union. Therefore, EU
109. Note, however, that the protection of EU law will not apply to a person who is a dual citizen of two
EU Member States and thus would not lose her EU citizenship if one of them revokes of her nationality.
110. Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act
2006; Immigration Act 2014.
111. Case C-34/09-Zambrano v Office National de l’Emploi 2011 E.C.R. I-01177.
112. See Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-1467, at para. 34 (Opinion of AG
Poiares Maduro).
113. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15.
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citizenship must not be lost due to long-term residence in other Member
States. This is the most obvious constraint EU law imposes on legislative
choices of the Member States.114 As we have noted in Part IV, long-term
residence abroad may constitute a legitimate ground for deprivation for all
citizens under some interpretations of the State discretion and genuine link
views, as well as under the ascriptive view for the category of naturalized
citizens only. Yet this ground cannot be accepted within the EU on any of the
four conceptions. As pointed out by de Groot in 2003, it would be paradoxi-
cal if EU citizenship status, which entails a right of free movement within the
EU, can be lost as a consequence of exercising that very same right.115 The
Netherlands, whose law foresees a loss of citizenship after ten years of
residence abroad, amended their legislation in 2003 to include an exception
for residence in other EU States.116
The 2014 German reform of the option duty for ius soli children can be
criticized for failing to fully respect this constraint. The current version of the
law exempts children who can demonstrate their genuine link to Germany
through eight years of residence or six years of schooling from the duty to
renounce a foreign nationality in order to retain their German citizenship
beyond their twenty-third birthday.117 Children born in Germany who are
German and third-country dual nationals by birth and who do not meet the
residence or schooling requirement because they have resided for too long in
another EU Member State will still have to renounce their third-country
nationality. The law foresees that they have to be notified by the German
authorities about their option duty so that they do not lose their German
citizenship inadvertently and have enough time to renounce their third-
country nationality. However, the German legislature was apparently unwill-
ing to accept as a general rule that long-term residence in the EU can count as
a genuine link to the EU that protects an EU citizen against involuntary loss
of EU citizenship. This provision potentially collides with free movement
rights under the EU Treaties not only because residence in another Member
State may lead to loss of EU citizenship, but also because it can deter the
child’s parents from exercising their own free movement rights, so as not to
jeopardize the citizenship rights of the children.
Defenders of the reform can invoke three reasons why it may still be
compatible with EU law. First, it is insufficient residence in Germany rather
than long-term residence abroad that leads to the loss of German and
potentially also EU citizenship. A person may reside up to seventeen years
abroad without jeopardizing her German citizenship. Second, this loss can be
114. See Rottmann, 2010 E.C.R. I-1467, at para. 11 (Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro).
115. Gerard-Rene de Groot, Towards a European Nationality Law, 8.3 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1
(2004).
116. RICKY VAN OERS, BETTY DE HART AND KEES GROENENDIJK, COUNTRY REPORT: NETHERLANDS
(Eur. Univ. Inst. 2013).
117. Farahat, supra note 26.
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avoided by renouncing a foreign nationality in time. Third, the option duty
merely applies the general principle of avoidance of dual citizenship involv-
ing third countries to Germans who have acquired their citizenship iure soli
and this principle itself is not in conflict with EU law.
These defenses appear, however, insufficient if one accepts our argument
that long-term residence of EU citizens in the territory of the EU
maintains their genuine link to the EU itself. From this perspective, it seems
incoherent that a Member State can deprive EU citizens of their status on
grounds of loss of genuine links if these persons have confirmed their
genuine link to the EU through mobility and long-term residence within EU
territory. A ‘genuine link to the EU’ argument differs, however, substantively
from a pure free movement argument. For the former it is the total time of
residence in the EU territory since birth that counts (including thus the time
spent in the EU country of citizenship) rather than the crossing of internal
borders. The practical difference would, however, be minimal if we construct
an EU genuine link standard by analogy with the Scandinavian rule for loss
of extraterritorial ius sanguinis.118 Under such standard, Germany should
exempt from the option duty those German-born citizens who have resided
for a sufficient time in the EU territory, who return there from a non-EU
country before their twenty-third birthday, or who declare their intention to
return.
C. Dual Citizenship Toleration in a Political Union
A third possible constraint concerns loss of citizenship on the ground of
voluntary acquisition of a foreign nationality. The essence of the argument is
that citizenship in an EU Member State cannot be regarded as ‘foreign’ for
deprivation purposes. In contrast to the previous argument, the present one
does not appeal to individual exercise of free movement or genuine links, but
to the collective nature of the EU as a political union whose Member States
have accepted duties of sincere cooperation and therefore cannot consider
acquisition of another Member State’s citizenship as proof of insufficient
loyalty. For the same reason they also cannot require renunciation of another
Member State’s citizenship as a condition for naturalization.
Apart from the argument for cooperation and trust within the Union, there
is an interesting relationship between free movement and self-government.
The Treaties, which proclaim the right to move and settle in another Member
State and guarantee that EU citizens are not discriminated vis-a`-vis the local
population, deliberately stop short of requiring the host Member State to
118. Denmark, Sweden and Finland phase out citizenship of the second generation born abroad at
age twenty-two but exempt those who are resident in another Scandinavian country, see EVA ERSBØLL,
COUNTRY REPORT: DENMARK (Eur. Univ. Inst. 2015); HEDVIG LOKRANTZ BERNITZ, COUNTRY REPORT:
SWEDEN (Eur. Univ. Inst. 2012); SAMPO BRANDER & JESSICA FAGERLUND, COUNTRY REPORT: FINLAND
(Eur. Univ. Inst. 2013).
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assure their full political integration through giving mobile EU citizens
voting rights in host country national elections.119 Yet the common constitu-
tional traditions of the European States, as well as the general principles of
democracy, suggest that the permanent residents of a country must be
included, at some point in time, in the process of self-government through
being “set on the road to citizenship.”120 At the same time, EU internal
migrants must be presumed to retain a stake in their country of origin when
they settle in another Member State. Thus, European citizens ought to be able
to participate in the self-government of both the Member State of origin and
of residence, and this right cannot be adequately satisfied by anything short
of full citizenship rights in each of them. Neither the country of origin nor the
host State can legitimately require them to renounce their membership of the
other political community as a condition for accepting (or not excluding)
them. In other words, mobile EU citizens should not have to choose between
exercising political rights in their State of long-term residence and retaining
the franchise in their Member State of origin. Member States should
therefore not make voluntary acquisition of a second EU citizenship (and a
fortiori service in a foreign army or public administration of another EU
Member State) a ground for deprivation.
While in most Member States this issue does not arise because they
generally tolerate dual citizenship both in incoming and outgoing naturaliza-
tions, among the minority of countries that remain committed to avoiding it
in either or both contexts, only Germany and Latvia make exceptions for EU
citizens, whereas Spain exempts Latin American countries with which it has
bilateral agreements on dual citizenship, even though it is not in a similar
political union with any of them.121 The rarity of these exceptions is rather
surprising, given that EU citizens residing in other Member States enjoy so
many other privileges compared to third-country nationals and that five
Member States (Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy and Romania) also offer
them facilitated naturalization after shorter residence periods.122 Even in the
case of Germany, which introduced the exception in 2007,123 the normative
argument for toleration of multiple citizenships within the EU does not seem
to have resonated very strongly. A restricted exception for EU Member States
was initially adopted in 1999 under the condition of reciprocity. This
condition was dropped in 2007 mainly because the old rule had become
administratively and legally too complex.124
119. See Art. 20 (2) TFEU.
120. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE. A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 60 (1983).
121. See KAY HAILBRONNER & ANUSCHEH FARAHAT, COUNTRY REPORT: GERMANY (Eur. Univ. Inst.
2015); KRISTINE KRUMA, COUNTRY REPORT: LATVIA (Eur. Univ. Inst. 2015); RUTH RUBIO MARI`N, IRENE
SOBRINO, ALBERTO MARTI´N-PE´REZ, FRANCISCO J. MORENO FUENTES, COUNTRY REPORT: SPAIN (Eur.
Univ. Inst. 2015).
122. See Comparing Citizenship, supra note 24.
123. See HAILBRONNER & FARAHAT, supra note 121.
124. See id.
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The importance of this relationship is not duly appreciated in jurispru-
dence either. When conceding that EU law cannot oblige Austria to restore
the citizenship of Janko Rottmann, Advocate General Maduro could have
justified his position in different ways, most obviously by pointing to the
limited competences of the Union. Instead, he emphasized that the loss was a
result of Rottmann’s personal decision to acquire another citizenship, and
stated that EU law does not preclude the legislation that deprives him
automatically from his Austrian citizenship.125 In our view, Member States
should not create such dilemmas for the EU citizens and force them to choose
between losing their original nationality and integrating in the new polity.
Creating incentives for the nationals of fellow Member States to renounce or
lose their citizenship is deeply inimical to the European project. While free
movement may only require the right of mobile EU citizens to be treated
equally with the nationals of their host country, a claim to political participa-
tion thus provides a much stronger reason for providing access to naturaliza-
tion in another Member State without losing a previous citizenship.
A possible argument against toleration of dual citizenship between Mem-
ber States on grounds of political participation claims is that this will allow
these EU citizens to cast their votes in two national elections. Indeed, in cases
of dual citizenship involving a third country, voting in two national elections
does not lead to double representation in any legislative body. In the EU
however, the European Parliament (EP) shares legislative powers with the
Council. In EP elections the double representation problem is avoided
because dual EU citizens have to choose to vote for candidates of either their
Member State of residence or of citizenship.126 The Council, however,
represents national governments that are elected by citizens residing in the
country and—in most cases—also by citizens residing abroad. Dual EU
citizens voting in national elections in two Member States may be said to
enjoy double representation in the Council. The implication of this argument
is that dual citizenship should be tolerated only if the second citizenship is
that of a third country or of a Member State that does not allow for external
voting. We believe that this argument is overstated, mainly because the
Council is an intergovernmental institution in which citizens are represented
only indirectly as they would be in an international organization. Our
conclusion is thus that the normative case for mutual toleration of dual
citizenship within the EU is robust.127
125. See Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-1467 at para. 34 (Opinion of AG
Poiares Maduro).
126. Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrangements for
the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for
citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, OJ L 329,
30.12.1993, p. 34, last amended by Council Directive 2013/1/EU of 20 December 2012, OJ L 26,
26.1.2013, p. 27.
127. Our most preferred option is extending dual citizenship toleration also to third-country
nationals on grounds of the genuine link principle.
98 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:47
The duty of sincere cooperation between Member States in matters of
citizenship need not only concern instances where EU citizenship itself is at
risk of being lost. This duty was quite ostensibly violated in the notorious
2010 tit-for-tat between Hungary and Slovakia discussed in Part IV.128 While
Hungary generously handed out passports to ethnic Hungarians in neighbor-
ing States, Slovakia responded by adopting a law that provided for loss of
Slovak citizenship in case of voluntary acquisition of another citizenship. As
both countries were already members of the EU, this did not lead to
deprivation of EU citizenship, so the constraints established by the CJEU in
Rottmann do not apply. Still, it is plausible that an EU dimension is also
involved if one Member State specifically targets a group for deprivation in
case of acquisition of the citizenship of another Member State.
D. Unequal Risk of Loss
Article 20(1) TFEU defines EU citizenship as derivative of Member State
nationality as well as additional without replacing it. Since its Grzelczyk
judgment the CJEU has repeatedly emphasized that “the status of citizen of
the European Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of
all the Member States.”129 This complex formula suggests, at the very least,
that EU citizens ought to be equally protected by EU law in the enjoyment of
their rights as EU citizens. Since the Rottmann judgment—which is widely
regarded as applying to all cases of loss of EU citizenship—one could argue
that such equality of protection must include equal security of the status
itself. Carried to its logical end, this argument would entail that the EU ought
to acquire a competence in determining itself the conditions of loss of EU
citizenship.
Although this may appear extremely controversial, it does not necessarily
lead to harmonization of Member States’ provisions for the acquisition of
national and EU citizenship. Switzerland provides empirical evidence for
this: The rules governing acquisition of Swiss citizenship through naturaliza-
tion are competences of the cantons and municipalities that are merely
constrained by federal legislation, whereas the loss of Swiss citizenship is
exclusively regulated by federal law.130 The argument can also be supported
theoretically since differential opportunities for access to a status do not
violate a norm of equality for those who hold the status, whereas unequal
conditions for loss clearly do.
Critics of this line of reasoning can point out that Swiss federal law
regulates not only the conditions for loss, but also for acquisition by birth and
128. See Baubo¨ck, supra note 10.
129. Case 184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 2001
E.C.R. I-06193 at para. 31.
130. ALBERTO ACHERMANN, CHRISTIN ACHERMANN, GIANNI D’AMATO, MARTINA KAMM, BARBARA
VON RU¨TTE, BARBARA & NICOLE WICHMANN, COUNTRY REPORT: SWITZERLAND (Eur. Univ. Inst. 2013).
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thus trumps sub-State competencies in all respects except with regard to the
naturalization of immigrants from outside Switzerland.131 If this model were
applied to the EU, Member States would merely be left with some marginal
powers to legislate on the naturalization of third-country nationals. This
would clearly be incompatible with the “shall not replace” clause of the EU
citizenship formula and thus cannot be regarded as compelling inference
from the present legal principles governing this status. Yet the Treaty articles
that would govern the exercise of such powers could be narrowly tailored to
make sure that the competence to constrain the discretion of the Member
States in deprivation does not ‘creep’ into regulation of conditions for
acquisition.
The norms of equality of membership inherent in every conception of
democratic citizenship can be reconciled with the essentially derivative
nature of EU citizenship. The Rottmann decision has already taken the first
step. It demands that Member States must take EU law into account and
apply a proportionality test if denationalization entails the loss of EU
citizenship. On the other hand, from a perspective of domestic equality of
national citizens, it is unacceptable to have two different levels of protection
against deprivation (or two different sets of conditions for voluntary renuncia-
tion) for those citizens who have exercised their freedom to move across
borders and those who have not. Therefore, Member States must apply a
Rottmann standard to any citizenship deprivation. Finally, one could add to
this a duty for Member States to coordinate amongst themselves conditions
for citizenship loss in order to make sure that they are not grossly unequal
and thus violate the equality of protection that the EU owes to all its citizens.
These three steps would enhance equality of conditions for loss and retention
of EU citizenship without fully transferring the legislative competence to the
Union.
E. Genuine Link to the EU
As we have already argued, while the Member States may still understand
their citizenship law as discretionary, that discretion is limited. Saint Kitts
and Nevis may legitimately decide to grant citizenship to everyone who can
invest a certain amount of money without ever setting foot on the islands, but
this choice should not be available to Malta, Cyprus or other Member States
of the Union.
A much stronger specific protection against deprivation would emerge if
the EU started to apply a genuine link constraint on deprivation of EU
citizenship. The genuine link criterion has generally been applied negatively:
The lack of a genuine link has been invoked as a reason against the granting
of citizenship status (or against invoking citizenship status as a reason for
131. Id.
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immunity and diplomatic protection, as in the Nottebohm case)132 and as a
justification for deprivation. However, genuine links can also be invoked
positively as a reason for awarding citizenship or as a reason against
deprivation.
In the course of reviewing the investor citizenship programs recently
adopted by Malta and other Member States, EU Justice Commissioner
Viviane Reding emphasized the need “to make sure that the minimum
requirement of a ‘genuine link’ to the country is met.”133 In a resolution of 16
January 2014, the European Parliament went further by claiming “that EU
citizenship implies the holding of a stake in the Union and depends on a
person’s ties with Europe and the Member States or on personal ties with EU
citizens.”134 To our knowledge similar references to a genuine link and
stakeholder criterion with regard to the citizenship polities of the Member
States have not been made in the past. They could signal a step towards a
more proactive EU approach.
Consider a case where an EU citizen who has resided in other EU Member
States for a long time is threatened with deprivation by her country of
nationality for reasons such as public security grounds or derivative loss.
Assume further that the person would not be deprived of her nationality if she
had resided permanently in her country of nationality. Should her residence
in the EU count as equivalent to residence in her country of nationality, and
resultantly, should the genuine link to the EU qualify as a relevant constraint
on the power of that State to deprive her of EU citizenship even in the
absence of a genuine link to the State of nationality? The answer is plausibly
“yes” if we consider EU citizenship as a fundamental status and involuntary
loss of that status as having serious consequences for the person not merely in
her relation to her State of nationality but to the EU itself.
Since EU citizenship is derivative from Member State nationality, a
genuine link to the EU cannot be a sufficient ground for access to EU
citizenship in the absence of a genuine link to any Member State. A
hypermobile third-country national who spends decades in the EU but never
stays long enough in any Member State to meet reasonable conditions for
naturalization will remain a foreigner unless the nature of EU citizenship
changes fundamentally. A genuine link to the EU could, however, play a
more important role in preventing involuntary loss of nationality in a
Member State, since in this case the derivative nature of EU citizenship is not
undermined. The person cannot retain EU citizenship without also retaining
132. See Sloane, supra note 50.
133. Press Release, Viviane Reding, Vice President of the European Comm’n, Citizenship Must
Not Be Up For Sale (Jan. 15, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-
18_en.htm.
134. European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2014 on EU citizenship for sale (2013/
2995(RSP)), available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/images/docs/EP-Malta-news%2016%20January
%202014.pdf.
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the nationality of a Member State. The impact of EU citizenship constrains
Member States’ discretion by requiring them to take a genuine link to the EU
into account in their national decisions on deprivation. After Rottmann, this
would no longer be an extraordinary move. As we discussed in Part V.B, the
2014 reform of the German ius soli option duty might provide a test case.
In Part V.C, we argued that a political union of States needs to secure
opportunities for full political participation of mobile citizens in both the
Member State of origin and that of long-term residence. Currently, no
Member State allows EU citizens from other Member States to vote in its
national elections.135 Mobile EU citizens thus face a choice between casting
external votes in the Member State where they are nationals and naturaliza-
tion in the Member State where they reside. If they meet the residence
conditions and decide to make a lifelong commitment to become citizens of
their adopted EU host country, they should not lose their franchise and
representation in the country of origin as a consequence of having to
renounce their previous nationality. This argument becomes plausible once
we combine the duty of sincere cooperation in a political union with a
genuine link principle. Instead of privileging mobile citizens over sedentary
ones, the argument would point out that those EU citizens who take a
decision to naturalize in another Member State and who meet fair conditions
for naturalization have a claim to political participation and representation in
two Member States. The general case for toleration of dual citizenship, in
cases of migrants with genuine links to two States, seems prima facie weaker
in the EU, where a single citizenship is already sufficient to guarantee free
movement and access to labor markets and social protection in other Member
States. For rights of political participation and representation, the case
becomes, however, much stronger in a political union of States that aims at
guaranteeing democratic equality of citizenship at both Member State and
supranational levels.
VI. CONCLUSION
The power of States to deprive citizens of their status was historically
strong and nearly universally acknowledged. Since the Second World War,
this power has been constrained in liberal democracies by the international
duty to prevent statelessness and by domestic standards of rule of law.
Nevertheless, these constraints have not amounted to a wholesale abolition of
the power. Few democratic States have followed the doctrine of “citizen
sovereignty” developed by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Europe, Poland
remains exceptional as the only country whose law does not foresee any
135. They can, however, vote in regional elections in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. See
the results for ‘Non-citizen Residents’ by ‘National Legislative’ in Comparing Electoral Rights,
EUDO CITIZENSHIP OBSERVATORY, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/comparing-electoral-rights (last visited
Feb. 11, 2015).
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involuntary loss of its nationality by adult citizens.136 Most other States
retain a repertoire of several legal grounds for deprivation in their nationality
laws.
As discussed in Part I, the recent expansion of deprivation powers has been
focused nearly entirely on averting threats to public security and has
specifically targeted suspects of terrorism. However, a closer examination of
justifications offered for such policies has revealed their incoherence or
ineffectiveness as punitive sanctions. We have therefore proposed a wider
perspective that considers all instances of involuntary deprivation as attempts
to restore the integrity of citizenship as membership in a political community.
Variations of the extent and focus of deprivation powers can be best
understood as emerging from different normative conceptions of citizenship.
In Part II, we argued that the basic distinction between voluntary and
involuntary loss already relies on a normative judgment that puts the burden
of justification for involuntary loss on the State rather than the individual.
In Part III, we suggested a typology of four conceptions: a State discretion
view, an individual choice view, an ascriptive community view, and a
genuine link view of the relation between States and their citizens. These four
conceptions are not meant to describe national citizenship regimes but
normative logics that are often articulated in specific provisions of citizen-
ship laws and that can be combined within a single law or change over time
through legislative reform. A State discretion view lends itself most easily to
justifying wide deprivation powers. The implications of the other three
conceptions are less obvious. An individual choice view will tend to
strengthen individual entitlements and protections, but will also promote
instrumental attitudes towards acquisition and renunciation that are likely to
undermine citizenship as a stable bond between individuals and States. The
ascriptive community view is inclined to exempt birthright citizens from
threats of involuntary loss, but opens the door for discrimination against
naturalized citizens in this regard. A genuine link view will instead consider
the strength of biographical bonds between individuals and States, which can
justify automatic loss by second or third generations born abroad.
In Part IV, we discussed five substantive grounds for involuntary loss of
citizenship: public security threats, non-compliance with citizenship duties,
flawed acquisition, derivative loss and loss of genuine links. We have shown
how the four conceptions often lead to different conclusions with regard to
justifications for these grounds and we illustrate how a suitably contextual-
ized genuine link conception can provide strong protection against involun-
tary deprivation, even in cases of severe threats to public security or flawed
acquisition.
136. The only persons who may lose Polish citizenship involuntarily are minor children under
age sixteen who are included in a parent’s renunciation of Polish citizenship.
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Part V, finally, identified five reasons why EU citizenship could provide
additional constraints against deprivation beyond those that emerge from
international and constitutional law. Two of these are already widely recog-
nized: the EU offers additional mechanisms of procedural protection and
makes it impossible to denationalize citizens on grounds of long-term
residence in another Member State. The other three grounds are more
controversial, but are at least partially supported by the current constitutional
architecture of the EU and could eventually become salient through further
citizenship jurisprudence of the CJEU: Dual citizenship between Member
States of a political union should be tolerated even by those States that
prohibit it when involving third countries; grossly unequal conditions of loss
of Union citizenship undermine the equality of the status itself; and EU
citizens may be protected against involuntary loss by their genuine links to
the EU itself.
ANNEX
TABLE 1. FOUR NORMATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP ACQUISITION
AND LOSS
Dominant Interests
State Individual
Citizenship
Relation
Generic StateDiscretion
Individual
Choice
Special AscriptiveCommunity
Genuine
Link
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